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 1 
Introduction 
‘The most violent political riots in Bosnia-Herzegovina since the civil war 
between 1992 and 1995’1 
 
Early in February 2014, the newspapers were filled with articles about Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
After years of silent acceptance of the unstable situation in Bosnia and the high rate of 
unemployment amongst the Bosnian population, the articles stated that the demonstrators 
would no longer conceal their dissatisfaction. Government buildings were burning as the 
protesters wanted the government to listen to the population after being ignored by the 
authorities for too long.2  
 Almost twenty years earlier, the civil war in Bosnia-Herzegovina (from now on 
referred to as Bosnia) was raging. The Western powers, being the United States of America 
(hereafter the US), the United Nations (UN) and the European Union (EU) were placed in an 
uncomfortable position by the continuing fighting between the three ethnicities in Bosnia. 
Promoting peace and democracy, they had been negotiating with the warring parties since 
March 1992.3 The civil war in Bosnia was one of the most horrific in modern times. The 
international community began to understand the size of the conflict and the growing number 
of victims as they met ‘setback after setback’ in Bosnia and experienced that ‘mediation could 
not work’.4 This resulted in even more pressure on the US and the EU to stop the bloodshed. 
After many failed negotiations, the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, led by the US, was signed on November 21, 1995. The agreement was signed in 
the American city of Dayton and is therefore known as the Dayton Agreement. It was 
officially signed in December 1995 by the leaders of the three warring parties: The Serbian 
president Slobodan Milošević, the Croatian president Franjo Tuđman and the Bosnian 
president Alija Izetbegović. The Dayton Agreement set up the political structure for Bosnia 
and its constitution and had a complicated character, being a compromise between the three 
                                               
1 Leijendekker, M. (2014) In Bosnië vinden de ergste rellen sinds jaren plaats, NRC Next, February 12, 2014 
Leijendekker, M. (2014) Bosnië door bloed en geld verscheurd, NRC Handelsblad, February 11, 2014 
Lindhout, S. (2014) Bosniërs komen in opstand, Volkskrant, February 8, 2014  
2 Nazar, M. (2014) In Bosnië wordt in burgerfora een nieuwe democratie gesmeed, De Correspondent, February  
Lindhout, S. (2014) Bosniërs komen in opstand, Volkskrant, February 8, 2014 
3 Jung, J. (2012) Power-sharing and democracy promotion in post-civil war peace-building, Democratization, 19:3, p. 486-506 
4 Burg, S.&Shoup, P. (1999) The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ethnic conflict and international intervention, M.E. Sharpe, London, p. 189 
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parties, but with the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, the bloodshed was over. 5  
However, with peace as the main priority, with this agreement the US and the EU presented 
only short-term solutions.6 
 None of the warring parties wanted to lose a say in the new constitution that had to be 
set up and therefore the peace negotiations remained complex. Although the fighting had 
ended, Bosnia was still deeply divided. This division in three parties was characterized the 
same way as it was during the war: by ethnicity.  In order to be assured of peace, the 
negotiators of the Dayton accords took these three ethnicities into consideration while 
forming a constitution for Bosnia. To be able to do so, the new constitution for Bosnia was 
formed on the basis of the so called ‘power-sharing’ approach. This approach assured power 
for all three ethnic groups, resulting in many different layers of government. Due to this 
dissension, the structure of the new constitution was cumbersome. Moreover, the country was 
partitioned into two autonomous entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (FBiH) 
and Republika Srpska (RS).7  
  The EU’s role in Bosnia during the war consisted mainly of financing humanitarian 
aid. The EU was forming its Common Foreign Policy and the unstable peace in Bosnia was an 
operation that the EU had no experience in. Because of this, it was a challenge for the EU to 
react to the tensions in Bosnia.8 Whereas the US initially took the leading role in Bosnia, the 
EU became more involved with Bosnia over the years. Bosnia became a potential candidate 
state for EU membership, and future plans were made following the creation of this new state. 
Still, Bosnia’s economy was not especially successful, the legal system did not meet the 
requirements of the EU membership criteria and the issue of the ethnic division could not be 
solved.9 The Dayton Agreement that had put an end to the war made it hard to change the 
constitution thereafter. The involvement of the EU was necessary in order to reform this 
constitution and support Bosnia. However, years after the establishment of peace it remains 
questionable whether the EU’s approach towards Bosnia has been effective. The constitution 
is still divided along ethnic lines; one being the part of the Bosniaks and Croat Bosnians, 
FBiH, and the other the part of the Serbian Bosnians, the RS. The many EU programmes, like 
                                               
5 Jung, J. (2012) Power-sharing and democracy promotion in post-civil war peace-building, Democratization, 19:3, p. 486-506 
6 Burg, S.&Shoup, P. (1999) The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Ethnic conflict and international intervention, M.E. Sharpe, London, p. 407 
7 Efendic, A. e.o., ‘Confidence in formal institutions and reliance on informal institutions in Bosnia and Herzegovina’ Economic of 
Transition, Volume 19(3) 2011, p. 521-540 
8 Juncos, A. (2005) The EU’s post-conflict intervention in Bosnia and Herzegovina: (re)Integrating the Balkans and/or (re)inventing the EU? 
Southeast European Politics, vol. VI, no. 2, p. 88-108 
9 www.europa-nu.nl/id/vh9ifjaxyovy/toetreding_bosnie_en_herzegovina_tot_de: Bosna i Herzegovina 
 3 
the Stabilisation and Association Agreement as preparation for EU membership and the 
CARDS framework providing financial aid, that entered into force during the years after the 
war and that are still in function, have not yet led to Bosnia’s accession to the EU. Bosnia is 
not yet a candidate state, solely a potential candidate state. Despite the EU’s involvement in 
Bosnia and the many programmes it has set up in Bosnia to help Bosnia become more 
integrated with the EU, this involvement has so far turned out to be insufficient in leading to 
Bosnia’s accession. This leads to the following question: 
 
 
Research Question 
How effective has the EU been in its actions towards Bosnia in the period since the Dayton 
Agreement? 
 
Questions related to the central question are: how has Bosnia been a subject of debate within 
the EU? Has the EU acted irresponsibly towards Bosnia? How did the democratisation in 
Bosnia develop and what was the influence of the European Union on the institutionalisation 
of Bosnia’s constitution?  
 
 
Aims of the thesis 
The main aim of this thesis is to explain the EU’s approach towards Bosnia and to discuss the 
influence of the EU on Bosnia’s constitution through a constructivist approach. With this, the 
limitations of the EU’s actions within Bosnia are discussed. It is important to point out that 
this thesis will not elaborate upon the perspectives on the EU from Bosnian politicians. The 
literature found on the Bosnian perspective is too unilateral and is hence inadequate to 
formulate a valid analysis. Therefore, it only analyses Bosnia from an EU perspective, 
discussing the EU’s programmes and approaches towards Bosnia. The aim of these analyses 
is to explore how effective the EU’s actions have been in Bosnia. Because Bosnia is a post-
conflict country at the borders of the EU, it is important to learn how the EU deals with this 
country. Bosnia is in particular interesting case, because the EU used both its hard power and 
its soft power in order to support Bosnia in its attempt to make Bosnia a member of the EU.10 
Never before has the EU invested so much support and effort into a non-candidate country 
                                               
10 Eeas.europa.eu/bosnia_and_herzegovina/index_en.htm 
 4 
and this makes Bosnia an interesting neighbouring country to examine. From this, there is 
much to learn about the EU and the interest it has in Bosnia and the EU’s policy in 
neighbouring countries.  
 
How these aims will be realised 
With the use of key constructivist concepts that will help to explain the analyses of the EU’s 
actions, the EU’s programmes in Bosnia are discussed. These concepts will contribute to the 
analyses, discussing the EU’s identity and the context of both the EU and Bosnia. According 
to constructivism, the EU is constrained by its structure, and its actions can be best explained 
from this perspective, because it explains why the EU acts the way it does.11 
Dealing directly with EU documents that discuss the approach towards Bosnia will give a 
clear conspectus of the EU’s position towards Bosnia from the EU’s perspective. To find out 
the effectiveness of the EU’s actions, analyses will be made of the situation of Bosnia’s 
constitution and the process of EU policy in Bosnia.  
 
Source material to be used 
In order to provide a clear overview of the EU’s actions in Bosnia and of its effectiveness, 
both primary and secondary sources are used. The primary sources consist of documents of 
the main EU institutions, the European Parliament, the European Commission and the 
European Council. These documents provide the view of the institutions on Bosnia and the 
way the EU wants to address itself to Bosnia. External perspectives are analysed as well. 
These will be sources from media, statements of politicians and analysts and academic 
analyses on the EU’s attitude and programmes in Bosnia, as well as on the constitution of 
Bosnia and EU press releases. These sources will provide an overview of the EU’s actions in 
Bosnia and its goals, enabling the analyses on the effectiveness of the EU policy towards 
Bosnia.  
 
Justification for this thesis 
The EU has been enlarged to 28 members over the last years, rapidly growing since the set-up 
of the Union. The change of borders of the EU mean that the EU has, over time, had various 
neighbouring countries, all with their own culture and history. Understanding how the EU 
deals with the countries on its borders will lead to better understanding of the EU itself. 
                                               
11 Hopf, T. (1998) The promise of constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security, vol. 23, no.1, p. 171-200 
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Bosnia is of the EU’s interest as it is important for the EU and its security that the situation in 
the post-conflict countries on the EU’s borders is stable. Therefore, now that Bosnia is a direct 
neighbour, it is in the EU’s advantage if Bosnia can develop into a stabilised well-functioning 
society. Twenty years ago, Bosnia stood further away from the EU’s borders and according to 
Silber and Little (1997) the need for the EU to intervene was not high enough. They write: 
 
“The fate of Bosnia-Herzegovina was the most tragic. The mountains and 
valleys of this beautiful republic were scarred with the charred and battered 
towns and villages from which at least half the population had either fled, been 
expelled, or killed. (...) The Bosnian government had entered the war 
disastrously ill-prepared. They placed their faith in an international community 
which, they believed, would not stand by and watch a European country so 
recently admitted as a sovereign member of the United Nations be wiped off 
the map. As the realization dawned that the Western world would not come to 
Bosnia’s rescue, the republic’s leaders dug in for a long war to redeem lost 
territory”12 
 
That the Western world and therewith the EU came too late to the rescue as the war broke out 
makes the EU’s role after the war even more interesting. This thesis aims to contribute to the 
understanding of the EU’s approach since peace was established towards Bosnia and its 
policy. The EU has promoted itself as carrier of wealth and prosperity, with democracy, the 
rule of law and human rights as the main priorities for its foreign policy. The High 
Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy Catherine Ashton stated 
as she succeeded Javier Solana in 2009:  
 
“… the values we hold, above all peace and prosperity, freedom and 
democracy, the rule of law and the universality and indivisibility of human 
rights. (…) I have seen the strength of the common voice of the European 
Union on the world stage. The reputation of the European Union is a good one, 
based on our strong values. Our commitment to the multilateral system of 
                                               
12 Silber and Little (1997) Yugoslavia, death of a nation, Penguin Books, p. 386 
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global governance through the UN and other bodies is clear. We already speak 
with conviction and clarity on the major challenges that face us (…)”13 
 
This thesis aims to shed a different light on the EU’s international relations than the EU 
carries out itself, claiming the EU’s programmes are effective. By using words such as 
‘strong’ when mentioning Europe’s values, Ashton shows the conviction in the EU’s 
effectiveness in global governance. The intention is not to bring forth a solution for the 
problems of Bosnia or to blame one of the actors for the instability still existing in Bosnia. It 
will analyse the leading research that has been performed under the influence of the EU on the 
democratisation process in Bosnia and the EU documents on Bosnia from a constructivist 
point of view. With this it endeavours to contribute to the understanding of Bosnia and the 
EU’s policy towards a post-conflict country on its borders.  
 
 
Chapter outlines 
1/ Theoretical framework 
 In the first section of this thesis the utilized methodology for this thesis will be 
elaborated. For this thesis constructivism is used for analysing the EU’s actions. First, an 
understanding of constructivism will be given. Next, the used concepts will be discussed. 
What is meant by Europeanisation, democratisation and other concepts? This involves 
discussing the academic debate on these issues and the different views.  
 
2/ Bosnia within the EU 
 The second section will look into the developments within the EU considering Bosnia. 
To what extent has Bosnia been a topic of discussion within the European Parliament, the 
European Commission and the European Council? Has there been enough capacity within 
these institutions to support Bosnia? The debates on Bosnia will be analysed, linking it to 
constructivism. Finally, the criticism of the EU will be discussed to show on what points the 
EU’s actions have not yet been sufficient.  
 
3/ The EU within Bosnia 
 The third section will describe and analyse what has been done by the European Union 
                                               
13 European Commission - SPEECH/09/567   02/12/2009 
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in Bosnia. It will discuss the attitude of the European Union towards Bosnia since the Dayton 
agreements. The question of whether or not the attitude of the EU towards Bosnia has been 
legitimate is extensively discussed by many authors. However, it seems the authors writing 
about Europe’s approach towards Bosnia seem unanimous in their opinion that the EU’s 
approach in recent years has been inefficient.  
 
4/ The democratisation process of Bosnia 
 In the fourth section the development of the democratisation within Bosnia will be 
discussed. An analysis will be given of the current power-sharing democracy in Bosnia. The 
question arises of how much more the West could have done, but also of whether the West 
could be blamed for the slow development of Bosnia’s democratisation. In the early 1990s, as 
the EU was becoming more united in order to avoid another war, it was faced with the bloody 
war in Bosnia. Yet, little was done to prevent escalation. Finally, the present state of the 
country will be discussed because changes from within the population seem to be on the way, 
as is noted from the demonstrations in early 2014.  
 8 
Chapter 1 - Theoretical framework  
 
The analyses made in this thesis will be explained through the perspective of social 
constructivism. The constructivist approach is most suitable, especially for international 
relations, because constructivism assumes that the identities of actors, here states, are a 
variable and depend on historical, cultural, political and social context.14 According to 
constructivists the world is ‘constructed’ by social actors and can therefore also be changed 
by social actors.15 Constructivism is often used to explain conflicts and shows which norms 
actors adhere to. It also explains the actions of actors following these norms.  Not only can 
constructivism be used in explaining a situation of conflict, but it can be used for peace 
building missions as well. According to constructivism, the EU can only act from its own 
norms and identity. 16 To explain the relationship between the EU and Bosnia and how 
effective the EU’s actions have been, it is important to understand why the EU acts the way it 
acts and in what context. For this, constructivism in the international relations is important 
when considering the EU, because social constructivism assumes that norms and values can 
lead an actors behaviour and therefore also in international relations.17 This is exactly what the 
EU is built upon; the idea that championing certain norms and values will compel other states 
to believe in them as well, because it can be seen that these values have worked within the 
EU, where no country has been at war with each other since the formation of the Union. From 
this aspect, the EU has linked its power to its norms and values. These norms and values have 
become its identity and it can therefore only act from them. This has led to an EU policy in 
Bosnia that is based upon democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Other than the realist 
conceptualisation, constructivism includes all kinds of context and influences to help explain 
the behaviour of actors. To demonstrate the choice for analysing the EU’s actions in Bosnia 
from a constructivist point of view, the background of constructivism is discussed and the 
realist approach versus the constructivist is elaborated upon.   
 
Realism versus Constructivism 
 To explain the importance of constructivism in international relations, it is necessary to 
                                               
14 Hopf, T. (1998) The promise of constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security, vol. 23, no.1, p. 171-200 
15 Barnett, M. & Duvall, R. (2005) Power in global governance, New York: Cambridge University Press,  p. 268 
16 Charles-Philippe, D. (2001) Alice in wonderland meets Frankenstein: constructivism, realism and peacebuilding in Bosnia, Contemporary 
Security Policy, vol. 22, no. 1, p. 1-30 
17 Barnett, M. & Duvall, R. (2005) Power in global governance, New York: Cambridge University Press,  p. 260 
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discuss its background. For this background, the realist perspective has to be elaborated, for it 
explains the emergence of constructivism. The realist approach in international relations does 
not acknowledge the concepts of norms and values, but was built on the idea that the actions 
of states were driven solely by the states’ self interest and material power.18 Looking at 
conflicts or the behaviour of actors in international relations from the realist point of view is 
based on factual arguments, not considering an actor’s identity. Charles-Philippe (2001) 
explains it clearly: 
 
“The realist begins with a rational and non-subjective interpretation of causes 
and factors underlying conflicts, such as the existence of an expansionist state, 
processes of fragmentation and polarization, the pursuit of contradictory 
interests by societies or states, the desire to protect or gain territory, and 
assistance to allies. Just as naturally as a forest fire results in destruction and 
regrowth, conflict is an age-old natural phenomenon. Ethnic confrontation is a 
form of conflict that is nevertheless governed by the same logic as conflict 
between states. Fearful of being weakened, marginalized or destroyed, an 
ethnic group, spurred by leaders seeking to conserve or enhance their power, 
attacks one or more other groups.(…) The cycle of conflict between ethnic 
groups seems to exhibit the same pattern as that between states: fragmentation 
of interests and polarization of power lead to non-violent confrontation and 
then to armed conflict, which is resolved and followed by a transition period 
(marked by victories and defeats), which itself gives rise to subsequent 
conflicts.”19 
 
When looking at the conflict in Bosnia from a realist point of view, there are several facts to 
be considered. After the death of Tito the ‘fragmentation of interests and polarization’ 
between parties developed. Thereby, there was a group that attacked and a group that was 
attacked, on several levels. There were allies, but this was out of self-interest with the only 
justification for supporting one another was avoiding a loss of power. According to realists, 
                                               
18 Hopf, T. (1998) The promise of constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security, vol. 23, no.1, p. 171-200 
19 Charles-Philippe, D. (2001) Alice in wonderland meets Frankenstein: constructivism, realism and peacebuilding in Bosnia, Contemporary 
Security Policy, vol. 22, no. 1, p. 1-30 
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there is no reason for a stronger ally to conclude an alliance with a weaker one.20 The realist 
approach is applicable to any conflict, but is not considering the relations between countries 
based on collective history or identities of countries. This means that realism when explaining 
actors behaviour proves insufficient. Realists explain only superficially the source of conflicts 
or, as is useful here, of peacebuilding missions. It only became clear that the realist’s way of 
explaining international relations failed to fully explain the complexity of conflicts after the 
end of the Cold War. Whereas until the Second World War the realist approach was the 
common theory to explain conflicts, with its focus on material, economic and military power, 
the view on conflicts had to change in the post-WW2 era as former colonies revolted against 
European countries. Without arguments that include interpretation or identity, the postcolonial 
conflicts could not be explained. Realist explanations of international relations were proving 
to be insufficient in fully explaining the contemporary world order, especially after the 
collapse of the USSR. Guzzini (2000) explains what happened in Europe:   
 
“Particularly relevant for International Relations has been the sudden 
self-awareness of the (European) international society that it is only a 
particularistic one despite its global expansion during the 19th century. It 
could no longer assume or impose its rules as being universally shared. (…) 
More profoundly, decolonization reminded Western powers that the rules of 
this international society were not only made by them, but for them. The arrival 
of the ‘Third World’ on the international scene made it impossible to overlook 
the fact that the international system was ruled in a way which had little to do 
with liberal principles, and that the story of economic progress had forgotten 
several parts of the world.”21 
 
The Western powers thus became aware of the fact that they had an identity that could differ 
from other countries. With the constructivist approach it was possible to explain how it had 
been possible that conflicts emerged for it considered many more details than just the state’s 
self-interest. In the Bosnian conflict elites made use of concepts like identity and 
‘constructed’ a new identity to turn the population against each other. This was done by, for 
                                               
20 Charles-Philippe, D. (2001) Alice in wonderland meets Frankenstein: constructivism, realism and peacebuilding in Bosnia, Contemporary 
Security Policy, vol. 22, no. 1, p. 1-30 
21 Guzzini, S. (2000) A reconstruction of constructivism in International Relations Theory, European Journal of International Relations, vol. 
6, no. 2, p. 147-182 
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example, emphasizing the greatness of Serbia and to underline the mistreatment of Serbs by 
Bosniaks, forcing people to choose an identity.22 The conflict in Bosnia was therefore not built 
on state power, but on identity differences that were emphasized by the elites, making the 
reason for war ‘society and the individuals who make it up.’23 
  According to constructivists, the EU’s actions can be explained by its identity and its 
norms and values. To support a post-conflict country in rebuilding its society and to prepare 
for EU membership, the EU can only act from its own identity, linked on norms and values as 
democracy, human rights and the rule of law. However, the problems that occur in the EU’s 
approach towards Bosnia came about different identities, the EU not speaking with one voice, 
Bosnia not speaking with one voice and the effectiveness of this approach will therefore be 
analyzed. This will be further discussed in explaining some of the concepts used.    
 
Conceptualisation 
To examine the influence that the EU has on the democratisation of Bosnia, the EU’s attitude 
towards the Balkan country has to be drawn. Since the end of the war in 1995, the EU has 
been occupied with supporting Bosnia to prepare for EU membership. Europeanisation of 
Bosnia seems to be the task the EU has set and its attitude would therefore be one of 
‘Europeanising Bosnia’. The EU’s attitude towards Bosnia can be explained through different 
approaches and concepts. As described by Hopf (1998) the attitude of an entity, here the EU, 
can be explained that it acts a certain way, because this is in its structure. The identity of the 
EU exists only by intersubjectivity, meaning that it is constructed and exists because it is 
recognized by others this way as well. According to Cooley (2013) the approach of the EU is 
the same as its approach towards any post-conflict country, where, as he sees it, Bosnia is a 
case.24 Having the same approach towards Bosnia as towards any other post-conflict country, 
shows that the EU acts from its structure, from where it is expected to act from, being linked 
to the EU’s identity. However, with this the EU only acts from its own norms and values, 
lacking a fuller consideration of the identity of Bosnia and what kind of approach is needed. 
Although Cooley states that the EU should have acted differently towards Bosnia, Domm 
(2011) argues there has not been another way for the EU to act. This argument is in line with 
the constructivist idea that the EU can only act from its own identity, resulting in the fact that 
                                               
22 Silber and Little (1997) Yugoslavia, death of a nation, Penguin Books, 
23 Charles-Philippe, D. (2001) Alice in wonderland meets Frankenstein: constructivism, realism and peacebuilding in Bosnia, Contemporary 
Security Policy, vol. 22, no. 1, p. 1-30 
24 Cooley, L. (2013) The European Union’s approach to conflict resolution: insights from the constitutional reform process in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Comparative European Politics, vol.11, no.2, p. 172-200 
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only way the EU can act differently towards Bosnia is by changing its identity. Domm does 
argue that the attitude of the EU could change, by changing the EU itself.25 Even with an 
identity which structures the EU and its actions, this identity is able to change. Social reality 
and identity is made (‘constructed’) by social actors, member states, and is therefore a 
variable, which makes it possible to change.26 However, a structure is hard to break and when 
convinced of one’s strong values, as does the EU, the approach of Europeanizing Bosnia was 
expected to be the right approach towards Bosnia to develop an independent and stable state. 
But what does this Europeanisation mean? According to Buller and Gamble (2002) 
Europeanisation is a concept where academics cannot seem to agree upon a standard 
definition, and therefore it has many explanations and meanings.27 Radaelli (2002) explains 
Europeanisation as follows: 
 
“Europeanisation consists of processes of (a) construction (b) diffusion and  
(c) institutionalization of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy 
paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which 
are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then 
incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and sub national) discourse, 
identities, political structures and public policies.”28  
 
Here, Radaelli explains Europeanisation as being a collection of processes to implement rules 
and procedures to do things the European way. These norms and values, the European way of 
‘doing things’, are first defined in the EU policy process. Radaelli’s description of 
Europeanisation is shared within the EU, as it is ‘incorporated in the logic of domestic 
discourse’. These processes define the EU’s identity and therewith its structure. From this 
structure, the EU acts the way it does. His choice of the use of the word ‘logic’ is remarkable 
for it assumes that the EU with its 28 members knows and agrees upon an overall feeling of 
Europeanisation and, after the shaping of the European norms, that this is then easily adopted. 
The EU is seen as an actor with ‘one voice’ as Radaelli possesses a rather positive definition 
of Europeanisation. Europeanisation is not only defined as a process that occurs solely within 
                                               
25 Domm, R. (2011) Next steps on Bosnia-Herzegovina: key elements to a revised EU strategy, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 
vol. 11, no.1, p. 53-67 
26 Hopf, T. (1998) The promise of constructivism in International Relations Theory, International Security, vol. 23, no.1, p. 171-200 
27 Buller and Gamble (2002) Conceptualising Europeanisation, Public Policy and Administration, vol. 17, no. 2, p. 4-24 
28 Radaelli, quoted in Grabbe, H. (2002) Europeanisation goes east: power and uncertainty in the EU accession process, Centre for European 
Reform, London 
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the EU; it can also be applied to candidate countries or, as is the case here, potential candidate 
countries like Bosnia. Whereas Radaelli’s definition of Europeanisation is described 
particularly from the perspective of the consideration of national states within the EU, 
Majstorović (2007) gives the definition for Europeanisation as ‘imposed on Bosnia.’29 He 
describes it as an approach of the EU towards Bosnia, defined by the High Representative of 
Bosnia (HR). He criticises the HR for its attitude towards the Bosnian people. According to 
Majstorović, Europeanisation is a construction of the EU for it to impose upon the Bosnian 
people. He states that:  
 
“Europeanisation was constructed as a mythic paragon for Bosnia, a 
quintessence of much-needed democracy enforced through persuasive political 
communication strategies of representation and misrepresentation, 
legitimization and coercion.”30  
 
According to Majstorović, Europeanisation is constructed by the Office of High 
Representative (OHR) to define a certain ‘us’ against ‘them’, where ‘us’ means the Western 
powers being the EU, NATO, OHR and ‘them’ means the Bosnian people. The creation of 
these two groups, the ‘self’ and ‘the other’ that is described by Majstorović is created to 
construct the EU’s actions by explaining their motives in Bosnia with subjective parts of its 
identity and the identity of the ‘other’ being Bosnia. This is evident in the statement of HR 
Wolfgang Petritsch who is quoted by Majstorović. Petritsch describes here what he feels is the 
essence of Europeanisation:  
 
“The Austrian author and Balkan expert Karl-Markuss Gauss recently stated 
critically: ‘The Balkans as a pejorative term have returned to themselves, and 
among the Balkan nations there is a competition over which belongs to the 
Balkans, which means is lost, and which one has managed to escape the dirt, 
corruption and hatred of the Balkans and can be counted as a part of Europe, 
that means of civilization.’ This also goes for Bosnia and Herzegovina… I 
believe this is the only way in which BiH can become a democratic, self-
                                               
29 Majstorović, D. (2007) Construction of Europeanization in the High Representative’s discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Discourse 
and Society, vol. 18(5) p. 627-651 
30 Idem, p. 629 
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sustaining and self-confident state. This is the essence of Europeanization.”31  
 
With this quote Majstorović wants to show the negative context that Bosnia is placed in by 
the OHR in comparison with the positive context within which the EU is seen. Here, 
Europeanisation is associated with the EU’s identity being ‘democratic, self-sustaining and 
self-confident’. The attitude of EU towards Bosnia can be explained by this speech; the EU as 
carrier of civilization and Bosnia as a place of ‘dirt, corruption and hatred’. This country has 
to be saved by the ‘good’ EU, Europeanisation as spreader of civilization, it seems that 
Petritsch is saying here. According to Juncos (2012) Europeanisation is imposing the EU’s 
norms and values on a country, but solely the impact the EU can have on a country, either 
negative or positive. Literally, Juncos states that Europeanisation is: “the various ways in 
which institutions, processes and policies emanating from the European level influence 
policies, politics, and polities at the domestic level.”32 Europeanisation is thus, as Juncos 
describes it, the influence that Europe has on external factors. Anastasakis (2005) gives a 
definition of Europeanisation as well, describing it as a broad concept: 
 
“Europeanization is a means and an end; it is a method as well as a substance; 
it is a project and a vision. It signifies a certain political, socioeconomic, and 
cultural reality, but it is also an ideology, a symbol, and a myth. It has a 
universal value by virtue of its historical, holistic, and globalizing nature. At 
the same time, its impact has internal consequences for Europe and an external 
significance for the rest of the world. Europeanization acquires different 
meanings in the different countries, it means structural transformation and 
modernization; for the more developed and richer countries, it is a smooth 
process of steady reform and adjustment. The latter countries have a greater 
impact on the meaning and substance of Europeanization, while the former 
have limited power to affect its course.”33  
 
To keep it specific to Bosnia and the influence the EU has on the constitution of the country, 
Europeanisation here is described as ‘structural transformation and modernization’ for the 
                                               
31 Idem. p 631 
32 Juncos, A. (2012) Member state-building  versus peacebuilding: the contradictions of EU state-building in Bosnia and Herzegovina, East 
European Politics, 28:1, p. 58-75 
33 Anastasakis, O. (2005) The Europeanization of the Balkans, Brown Journal of World Affairs, vol. XII, issue 1, p.77-87 
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poorer countries at least. Here, Anastasakis also gives a positive explanation to the concept of 
Europeanisation, using words such as ‘ideology’, ‘symbol’ and ‘myth’. As well as Radaelli, 
he gives several meanings to one concept, showing that Europeanisation is not easily used as 
a fixed definition. For Bosnia Europeanisation would mean, according to Anastasakis, 
reformation of the domestic structures and the move towards a more modernized society. This 
is similar to Petritsch’ speech, explaining Europeanisation as a reality as well as an ideology, 
about the EU’s norms and values like democracy, human rights and rule of law, aspects that 
Bosnia failed to build up on its own and therefore has ‘limited power to affect this course’. 
This is equivalent to the delineation Tzifakis (2012) gives of Europeanisation. Tzifakis refers 
with Europeanisation to EU-isation, meaning that the concept of Europe is used as a 
euphemism for the EU. He states that the EU tries to transform the applicant country’s (here 
Bosnia) ‘domestic structures and policies.’34 This means imposing the EU’s identity onto 
Bosnia. Imposing one’s identity is however contradictory to democracy and other norms the 
EU stands for. Here, the principle of conditionality is used. As Grabbe (2002) describes, 
Europeanisation of Bosnia is not only setting up a constitution after an EU model, but also 
includes the ‘added dimensions of conditionality and accession negotiations.’35 The principle 
of conditionality is therefore a part of Europeanisation. This is an important part of the 
conceptualisation of Europeanisation and will be further discussed below.  
  Where Europeanisation is generally used as a concept with a positive explanation, 
spreading the EU’s norms and values, democracy, human rights and rule of law spread over 
Europe, in particular Majstorović here outlines the negative sense the word entails, presenting 
Europeanisation by the OHR as ‘a change to normality presupposing an abnormal Bosnia’.36 
As Europe defines itself as standing for the more democratic and self-confident state, Bosnia 
is therefore assumed to be the opposite, being weak and undemocratic. The policy of the EU 
having the Europeanisation approach can therefore only be applied when there is a principle 
of conditionality involved, for the country needs to take over these ‘positive’ norms and 
values that constitute the EU. The EU needs to set conditions to Bosnia, and to reward the 
country with EU membership if it applies these conditions. This is the only way the EU can 
stay true to its identity because it will not force Bosnia, but instead support it in the 
development of the Europeanisation process. With the use of the principle of conditionality, 
                                               
34 Tzifakis, N. (2012) Bosnia’s slow Europeanisation, Perspectives on European politics and society, vol. 13, no. 2, p. 131-148 
35 Grabbe, H. (2002) Europeanisation goes east: power and uncertainty in the EU accession process, Centre for European Reform, London 
36 Majstorović, D. (2007) Construction of Europeanization in the High Representative’s discourse in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Discourse 
and Society, vol. 18(5) p. 627-651  
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the EU gives Bosnia, the weak ‘other’ the possibility to take over this identity with shared 
norms and values as democracy and the rule of law. Wichmann (2004) underlines that the 
principle of conditionality is one of the concepts of EU policy towards Bosnia and is a part of 
Europeanisation. Wichmann argues that the EU’s policy towards the Balkans is made out of 
two concepts, stating:  
 
“Two instruments have shaped the policy of the European Union in this region 
for at least five years now and lie at the core of the EU’s policy approach 
towards the region: the regional approach and the principle of 
conditionality.”37  
 
The principle of conditionality used by the EU towards Bosnia is explained here as the EU 
setting conditions for Bosnia. These conditions are set in line with the norms and values of the 
EU, inter alia being setting up a democracy and respecting human rights. Conditionality is 
described by Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier (2004) as a strategy of ‘reinforcement by 
reward’. This means that reward is given to Bosnia under the right circumstances and 
conditions: if the government adheres to the conditions it gets rewarded, if not, the reward is 
withdrawn. Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier distinguish two kind of conditionality: 
democratic conditionality and acquis conditionality. Democratic conditionality is the 
fundamental norms and values of the EU, like liberal democracy and taking into account the 
protection of human rights, whereas acquis conditionality is the conditions listed in the acquis 
communautaire.38 To accomplish real change within Bosnia, the EU has to address these 
conditions not only to the Bosnian authorities. As Brljavac (2011) states that EU 
conditionality needs to be visible to Bosnian citizens in order to strengthen support for 
reforms.39 Now that the conditionality is only presented to the Bosnian politicians, it will not 
be able to be strong enough as a power by itself to obtain reforms. These Bosnian politicians 
are obtaining power by holding on to identity based on ethnicity differences. Exposing other 
aspects of Bosnia’s identity not based on ethnicity or religion would weaken the power of the 
nationalist leaders. The content of EU conditionality for Bosnia is presented by Brljavac in 
                                               
37 Wichmann, N. (2004) European Union and the Southeastern Europe- a clash of the principle of conditionality and the regional approach, 
UDK 339.923:327 (4) Biblid 0025-8555,56, vol. LVI, br. 1, p. izvorni naucni rad 
38 Schimmelfennig, F and U. Sederlmeier (2004) Governance by conditionality: EU rule transfer to the candidate countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, Journal of European Public Policy, 11:4, p. 661-679 
39 Brljavac, B. (2011) Examining the (non) influence of the European Union in Bosnia and Herzegovina: has a Europeanisation process 
failed? Contemporary European Studies, 2/2011, p. 87-105 
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another article: 
 
1. The Copenhagen Criteria; 
2. The 1997 Regional Approach and the 1999 SAP; 
3. Country specific conditions to be met before entering the SAA negotiations and the 
CARDS framework; 
4. Conditions related to individual projects and the granting of aid, grants or loans;  
5. Conditions that arise out of peace agreements and political deals. 40 
 
Although these five points seem much more extensive than only the Copenhagen Criteria 
which are used for candidate countries, the principle of conditionality for Bosnia according to 
Dziewulska (2010) is limited. The main reason for this is that it is set in the constitution of 
Bosnia that politicians disagree rather than cooperate, because the government is led by the 
same (nationalist) parties which faced each other in the war.41 The principle of conditionality 
should contain, according to Dziewulska, a change of constitution. According to the authors 
Džihić and Wieser (2011) EU conditionality towards Bosnia is characterised by two sorts of 
conditionality: the political conditionality and the EU democratic conditionality.42 The 
political conditionality is the same as for all member states or candidates: the Copenhagen 
Criteria. The democratic conditionality is based upon ‘the principle of own merits’43 meaning 
that it is shaped for the country it is dealing with specifically. These concepts are renamed, 
but are basically the same as the allocations that Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier make. 
Džihić and Wieser argue that EU conditionality within Bosnia faces problems, due to the 
constitution of Bosnia being divided along ethno-nationalist lines, in line with Dziewulska:  
 
“…on the one hand, national leaders give a commitment to EU accession and 
its conditions (for example, police reform), yet use the negotiations to block the 
work and efficiency of state institutions and polarise the public along well-
established ethno-nationalist lines. Using ethno-nationalist logic hides the lack 
of substantial reforms, corrupt practices and an adherence to ‘reserved 
                                               
40 Brljavac, B. (2011) Europeanisation Process of Bosnia and Herzegovina: Responsibility of the European Union? Balkanologie, vol. XIII, 
no. 1-2 
41 Dziewulska, A. (2010)  An impossible pasodoble: the EU and Bosnia today, Centre of Europe, University of Warsaw, 13/2010 
42 Dzihic & Wieser (2011) Incentives for democratisation? Effects of EU conditionality on democracy in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Europ-
Asia Studies, 63:10, 1803-1825 
43 Idem.  
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domains’. Because the structures of the Dayton Peace Agreement lead national 
leaders in BiH to operate along ethno-nationalist lines, they continuously 
undermine statehood in the country. Therefore EU conditionality has limited 
potential to strengthen democracy in BiH due to its reliance on formal 
structures and nationalist elites.”44  
 
They state thus that EU conditionality is not suitable to for Bosnia in this situation, even 
though Bosnia is a (potential) candidate country. Another author, Bieber (2011) also states 
that EU conditionality is limited when it comes to Bosnia. Bieber argues that the EU 
conditionality as part of Europeanisation is not the right approach towards Bosnia, for instead 
of membership requirements, Bosnia needs a state builder.45 Bieber notes that ‘the clarity of 
conditionality’ is further clouded by ‘enlargement fatigue’ within the EU. This means that the 
EU has enlarged too quickly and has lost its enthusiasm for spreading Europeanisation over 
the rest of Europe. However, it is in the EU’s interest to have stable countries at its borders 
and the way to achieve this is with the Europeanisation of Bosnia, using the principle of 
conditionality. An important aspect of this is the democratisation of Bosnia, for this is one of 
the core concepts from which the rest of the EU’s values such as human rights and the rule of 
law are built upon. Therefore, democratisation of Europe can be described as one of the main 
tasks of the EU, for it is the force of its normative power. Democratisation is consequently an 
important concept for this research as well.  
  Democratisation is described by Chandler (1998) from NATO’s perspective of 
democratisation. He states that the NATO defines democratisation very comprehensively:  
 
“…covering the broad range of new peace building priorities, ‘top-down’ 
international regulation of elections, institutional development, and economic 
management, and also ‘bottom-up’ assistant to develop a democratic political 
culture through civil society-building.”46  
 
                                               
44 Idem.  
45 Bieber, F. (2011) Building impossible states? State-building strategies and EU membership in the Western Balkans, Europe-Asia studies, 
vol. 63, no. 10, p. 1783-1802 
46 Chandler, D. (1998) Democratization in Bosnia: the limits of civil society building strategies, Democratization vol. 4, no. 4 
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Chandler describes democratisation as being much more than just organising elections every 
few years, because he realises that there is: 
 
“the need for the consent of the governed, the accountability of policies to the 
electorate, the opportunity for participation in decision-making, and for the 
decision-making process to be transparent.”47  
 
The description Chandler gives here of democratisation is thus not just elections and a 
possibility for citizens to vote. Important aspects that cannot yet applied to Bosnia as the 
transparency of a government in a country and the need for the consent of the governed show 
that the democratisation progress in Bosnia is still at an early stage. As Chandler describes it, 
democracy is not easily adopted or imposed as the democratisation of Bosnia by the EU is 
showing. Democracy is explained by Jung (2012) for post-civil war countries:  
 
“Democracy is  generally conceptualized as a political regime in which key 
executive and legislative seats are filled by contestants elections and open 
participation. In the post-civil war context, it should also mean a democratic 
regime sustained by the country’s own citizens, not by external actors.”48  
 
Again, the importance of the country’s citizens is outlined, for a democracy can only work 
optimally when the citizens are supportive and it is not imposed on the people. Be that as it 
may, taking the Bosnian population in consideration, it only has the possibility to vote for the 
parties that consist. The main parties in Bosnia are nationalist parties, still using aspects of 
ethnicity to focus on the differences in identity. As Charles-Philippe puts it:  
 
“The norms of justice, democracy and the free market can have no meaning in 
circumstances of scapegoating and demagoguery by dictators who take 
advantage of crises to further their own ends”.49 
 
                                               
47 Chandler, D. (1998) Democratization in Bosnia: the limits of civil society building strategies, Democratization vol. 4, no. 4.  
48 Jung, J. (2012) Power-sharing and democracy promotion in post-civil war peace-building, Democratization, 19:3, p. 486-506 
49 Charles-Philippe, D. (2001) Alice in wonderland meets Frankenstein: constructivism, realism and peacebuilding in Bosnia, Contemporary 
Security Policy, vol. 22, no. 1, p. 1-30 
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The progress of democratisation can therefore never develop if the EU’s approach towards the 
Bosnian politicians is one of imposing its norms and values like democracy on the authorities. 
It can use the principle of conditionality, but without transparency of how these conditions are 
implemented, the EU’s actions will lead to a deadlock. The goals the EU has set for Bosnia 
since the end of the war and today are far apart. With the Dayton Agreement, a democracy 
was set up with a different priority. The first, and main, priority was ending the fighting and a 
short-term resolution had to fulfil this priority. The democracy set up from this was imposed 
to stop the war. Therefore it was set up with a power sharing approach, the only way the 
agreement could be signed at the time by all parties. According to Zahar (2001) the only way 
a power-sharing approach can work is when ‘parties provide each other with mutual assurance 
against potential marginalization.’50 Her definition of power-sharing is: 
 
“A set of institutions that aim to address the problem of credible commitment 
by ensuring ‘inclusive decision-making, partitions decision-making, 
predetermined decisions, or some combination of these.’ Inclusive decision-
making addresses the fear of marginalization or exclusion that parties to a 
peace settlement often experience in the early stage of war-to-peace 
transitions.”51  
 
This is applicable to Bosnia, for this power sharing approach was the only way for Bosnia to 
obtain a peace agreement. However, the power sharing approach is still used for it is recorded 
in the constitution of Bosnia. This power sharing constitution, as set up in the Dayton 
Agreement, is highly criticised by Jung (2012) who states that power sharing is likely to 
function as an institutional barrier to the establishment of democracy.52 Jung argues that short-
term peace-making and long-term democracy promotion are conflicting objectives, especially 
when the conflict ends by external mediation that imposes power-sharing institutions. 
According to Jung power-sharing is for Bosnia nothing more than a short-term solution of the 
international community, which was required in order to initiate negotiations to make peace 
deals.53 Furthermore, Jung argues power-sharing is likely to delay democratisation in the long-
run. As the EU not requiring a change of constitution it means that the EU is not interested in 
                                               
50 Zahar, M. (2001) the limits of power-sharing in post-civil war settings, Department of political science, Montréal 
51 Idem.  
52 Jung, J. (2012) Power-sharing and democracy promotion in post-civil war peace-building, Democratization, 19:3, p. 486-506 
53 Idem.  
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long-term solutions, for it set up a power sharing institution in Bosnia that, according to Jung, 
can only delay the process of democratisation. Blocking the process of  democratisation is 
stopping the Europeanisation of Bosnia. Cooley (2013) confirms this contradictory approach 
of the EU stating that the EU does not intend to reform the constitution of Bosnia, but tries to 
handle Bosnia as a conflict-affected neighbouring country.54 At the same time the EU 
approaches Bosnia as European and future member state.  
  Europeanisation in this research will be used as meaning the structural reforms Bosnia 
has to adopt in its constitution in line with the EU model. This EU model means not only 
having a democracy with the associated elections, but also a democracy open for everyone to 
access and a constitution that takes into account the human rights of all its citizens. 
Europeanisation here consists of the two main concepts discussed above; the principle of 
conditionality and democratisation. The EU’s actions in Bosnia are to come to this 
Europeanisation. According to the constructivist approach, the EU can only handle 
negotiations from this starting point, as it is derived from the EU’s norms which form the 
basis for its political structure and outlook. The EU’s identity consisting of spreading 
democratisation and its norms and values means that it approaches Bosnia from a one-sided 
perspective, not taking into consideration the Bosnian identity and perspective. To examine if 
this Bosnian identity emerges from EU policy, the next chapter will elaborate upon the way 
Bosnia is discussed within the European institutions.  
 
 
                                               
54 Cooley, L. (2013) The European Union’s approach to conflict resolution: insights from the constitutional reform process in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, Comparative European Politics, vol.11, no.2, p. 172-200 
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Chapter 2 -  Bosnia within the European Union 
 
‘The EU has achieved far more through its gravitational pull than it could ever 
have done with a stick or a sword.’55  
 
In 2006 the European Commissioner for Enlargement, Oliver Rehn, made a statement in a 
speech about European security, saying that: ‘enlargement has proven to be one of the most 
important instruments for European security.’56 From these words it can be concluded that 
Rehn is very confident in the capacity of the EU to stimulate reforms based solely upon the 
attractiveness of EU membership. However, basing its power on attractiveness  means that the 
EU acts from a simplified perspective. This can result in an ineffective approach towards 
Bosnia, not being able to support Bosnia in its progress to Europeanisation, because it does 
not take into consideration the Bosnian perspective. Before the Bosnian war, in 1991, 
European Commissioner Jacques Poos stated that it was ‘the Hour of Europe’, meaning that it 
was the responsibility of the EU to act in the Yugoslavian crisis. 57 The reason for Poos to 
refer to the responsibility of the EU considering this crisis was the opportunity the EU had to 
spread its norms and values on world stage. From a constructivist point of view, with a crisis 
so close to its borders, the young EU, with its promotion of peace and stability, was put in a 
difficult position. The structure of the EU results in the expectation that the EU will act for it 
defends its norms and values and the human rights worldwide. At the same time, this structure 
constraints the EU to act effectively in the conflict country that heavily differs from itself, for 
it can only act from its own identity carrying these norms and values, resulting in 
ineffectiveness. 
 
World context in the 1990’s 
In November 1989 the Berlin Wall fell and soon after, for the first time in 28 years, East and 
West Germany were united again. The political situation in Europe changed radically. The 
decline of communism and the fall of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 changed the 
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56 Idem.  
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political arena on the world stage.  For the EU this change in world politics was the 
opportunity to expand the EU norms and values. With the fall of communism, the norms of 
democracy and a free market emerged as winners from the Cold War. This was the 
opportunity for the EU to use its power of attractiveness and enlarge its influence to increase 
its power on the world stage. 58 Establishing peace in Bosnia would convince the world of the 
power of attractiveness of the EU and show the ability of the EU to bring peace and stability. 
However, as Charles-Philippe states:  
 
“western policies promoting economic reforms, democratization, and respect 
for human rights did not bring about the expected results. (…) it is extremely 
difficult for a third party to mediate or manage a conflict in a context of 
interethnic hostilities.”59 
 
This became clear after peace was established after three years of war and many peace 
negotiations. To see how the EU institutions dealt with Bosnia, the debates on Bosnia will be 
looked into.  
 
The EU institutions on Bosnia 
As mentioned above, the 1990s were marked by a drastic political shift in the world. After the 
Dayton Agreement was signed, the EU had the opportunity to try its influence in the Balkans 
with its power of enlargement. As the EU was forming its Common Foreign and Security 
Policy (CFSP), the instabilities in Bosnia were seen as the first challenge of this policy.60 As 
explained by constructivism, the EU is only able to deal with countries from its own 
perspective and identity. As this identity of the EU compels it to create economic and political 
stability based on the norms of democracy, human rights, and the rule of law when countries 
are being accepted as member states, it is in the process of creating this stability in Bosnia 
when it supports the road to accession of Bosnia. To see if this is indeed the case, debates 
concerning Bosnia within the three main EU institutions will be discussed. These institutions 
are the European Parliament, the European Commission and the European Council. 
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The European Parliament 
In the first half of 1998, the EP desired in a report that the reconstruction project in Bosnia 
after the war would be led by an EU delegation. The EP states that this way ‘the visibility of 
the EU in the peace process can be promoted.’61 After examining the insights of different EP 
delegates in Bosnia, the EP concluded that aid had to be given on location, quickly, flexibly 
and organised in cooperation with the local entities. In the same report, the EP proposed a 
monthly conference in Bosnia led by the Commission and member state representatives to 
discuss the reconstruction and to inform all concerned parties about the coordination of all the 
aid-programmes.62 Although action was wanted by the EP, the use of words such as 
‘visibility’ show the need the EP feels to merely show its presence in Bosnia, as if the 
presence of the EU will pressure Bosnian authorities to reform. Although giving aid is thus 
discussed, concrete plans to stimulate Bosnia to develop are not discussed. 
 In 2003, in discussing the upcoming Thessaloniki summit, the EP urged Bosnian 
authorities to develop adequate legislation for the protection of minorities before they would 
be able to qualify for the Stabilisation and Association Process, making Bosnia a potential 
candidate.63 In a resolution of 2004, the EP indicates that the Commission can always propose 
ways on how the countries can develop their integration process, but it stresses that 
consultation of the EP is necessary.64 Here, the intent comes to the fore to make Bosnia a 
member state in the future, but by stressing in a resolution that the Commission can make 
propositions on how this should be carried out, the EP only expresses its will to make Bosnia 
a subject of debate, without adequate proposals on how to proceed.65  
  In July and October 2013, meetings were held in Brussels and Sarajevo between 
members of the EP and the Bosnia and Herzegovina Parliamentary Assembly. Bosnia’s 
development towards eventual participation in economic policy coordination under the 
Economic and Monetary Union was discussed.66 Since the end of the war the EU’s actions in 
Bosnia are discussed by the EU, but it still does not achieve its goals as it is operating in a 
cumbersome, bureaucratic system, namely the EU.67 Every resolution that is made is in 
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dialogue with all European institutions and member states, making common policies very 
hard to reach.   
  The Dayton Agreement is set up as a short term solution, but the EP discusses Bosnia 
as having a future within the EU and therefore long term explications are needed. However, it 
still approaches Bosnia from an EU perspective, starting from the EU norms of democracy, 
human rights and rule of law.  It does not discuss the Bosnian identity or the possibility of 
switching to a different approach, but almost twenty years after the end of the war and the 
setting up of the Dayton Agreement, the EP still expresses its concerns about Bosnia and its 
future. The Commission is requested to keep searching for improvement in Bosnia’s 
legislation. The EP does not give up on the case of Bosnia, but it seems that it keeps looking 
for the aid Bosnia needs, not considering the fact that aid might not be effective in dealing 
with a Bosnian elite that tries to hold on to power.  
 
The European Commission 
The European Commission (hereafter the EC) proposed the start of the Stabilisation and 
Association Process for (inter alia) Bosnia.68 Through Commission delegates, the EC stays 
informed on the developments of the reforms imposed on Bosnia by the EU. These delegates 
have committees that analyse the situation in Bosnia and estimate whether Bosnia is ready to 
implement the Stabilization and Association Agreement (SAA). It took the EC four years to 
conclude its research on Bosnia’s readiness for implementing a Stabilization and Association 
Agreement (SAA).69 It resulted, in November 2003, in the EC’s approval that negotiations on 
the SAA could start. The Commission’s approval for the start of negotiations show 
confidence in the negotiations with Bosnia. However, a year later the European Chief in 
Bosnia, as well as the spokesman for the European Commission’s delegation Frane Maroevic, 
acknowledged that progress was being made, but at too slow of a pace.70 Almost ten years 
after the war the Commission expresses its doubts on the commitment of the Bosnian 
authorities towards reforms. Deduced from this it is to say that the Commission does not 
doubt the EU’s actions, but instead doubts the reaction of the Bosnian authorities. The 
Commission does refer to Dayton as being limited, stating:  
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“The complexity of the existing Dayton order could hinder BiH performance. 
The system established at Dayton has frequently been questioned both within 
and without BiH. Certainly, from a perspective of European integration it is 
difficult to argue that the current constitutional order is optimal.”71 
 
Here, the EC admits that the Dayton Agreement is not the most optimal constitution set up by 
the Western powers. However, in the same report it states that: “...the constitution is no 
insuperable obstacle to reform or to European integration.” The responsibility for reforms 
lies within the Bosnian government and although it is built upon the constitutions set up in 
Dayton, the EC emphasises that the Bosnian authorities are cooperating, but too slowly. In 
July 2004, Maroevic declared:  
 
“Authorities still have to do a lot of work. They have to implement reforms and 
to pass the law on public broadcasting. Even if they implemented all 
conditions, it would take several months to create a strategy that would cover 
all the details for negotiations. So we believe that mid-next year is a 
reasonable time.”72  
 
A year later the EC  was again openly concerned about the slow progress Bosnia had made 
and placed the responsibility with the Bosnian authorities, as the ambassador of Austria told 
Sophia Sebastian in an interview in 2006 on the SAA:  
 
“The Commission feels that the progress of reforms or improvement of the 
constitution still is very slow and the Bosnian government on many aspects is 
not cooperating properly. The EU does everything it can to help and support 
Bosnia and its citizens to improve the democracy and the standards of living. 
However, according to the Commission the ultimate responsibility lies with the 
political leaders of Bosnia, not within the EU.”73  
 
The Commission places the responsibility of the democratisation process and the 
improvement of the standards of living with the political leaders of Bosnia. With the 
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continuing aid programmes and negotiations on agreements to eventually lead to accession to 
the EU, the EU keeps supporting the constitution that it criticizes itself. Still, the Commission 
states that ‘the EU does everything to help and support Bosnia and its citizens’. This help and 
support however consists of aid programmes and agreements made with the Bosnian 
authorities. The Commission places the responsibility with the Bosnian politicians, but this 
responsibility is only given when the same politicians comply with the conditions set by the 
EU. In short, the EC maintains a situation that it simultaneously rejects. 
 
The European Council 
The European Council (hereafter the Council) adopted a ‘regional concept’ in 1997 to develop 
the rebuilding of the country and to help the process of cooperation between the Balkan 
countries during the democratisation of Bosnia.74 In June 2000 the Council held a summit in 
Santa Maria de Feira in Portugal to discuss the prospect of EU accession for the Balkans. The 
Council discussed the different countries in the Balkans and how these countries would be 
able to access the EU. It resulted in an important decision, stating that all SAP countries were 
potential candidates for accession to the EU.75 The reason for this continuing support of 
Bosnia is explained by the Councils concluding remark: 
 
“A democratic, cooperative FYR living in peace with its neighbours will be a 
welcome member of the European family of democratic nations. The European 
Council supports civil society initiatives as well as democratic forces (...). The 
Union looks forward to the time when the FYR will be able to participate fully 
in the Stabilization and Association Process.” 76 
 
Here, the Council declares that it welcomes all former Yugoslavian countries to join the SAP 
and therefore become a potential candidate for accession. In mentioning the ‘European family 
of democratic nations’ it states the main priority for this possible accession: a working 
democracy. The European perspective for the integration of the Western Balkans is clearly 
described by Massari who states that:  
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“The integration of the Western Balkans into Europe would complete the 
project of European reunification and democratisation. (...); it would create 
the conditions for security and stability in a region that has been, in the recent 
past, afflicted by wars and ethnic conflict and which still presents numerous 
non-traditional security challenges (organised crime, human trafficking, drug 
trafficking, and weapons smuggling. Last but not least, the Euro-Atlantic 
community has an interest in integrating the Balkan states, to strengthen 
NATO’s ‘southern flank’ and to draw resources for the global war against 
terrorism.”77  
 
With this Massari states that the EU is in favour of the integration of the Western Balkans for 
its own reasons, handling from the EU’s structure and its own identity. Not taking into 
account the Bosnian identity and of what this could consist of. In the declaration of the 
Thessaloniki summit the Council stated that: “...rapprochement with the EU will go hand in 
hand with the development of regional cooperation.”78 The Council seems to be confident at 
the summit in 2003 that Bosnia will move forward with the prospects of EU membership and 
that this prospect will help Bosnia to reform in order to meet EU conditions. An important 
decision made at the summit was that Bosnia was identified as a potential candidate for EU 
membership.79 This was the start for many more agreements made between Bosnia and the 
EU. All these agreements are based on EU membership, still seen from the Council’s 
perspective as the best weapon against the tensions within Bosnia.  
 In February 2008, the Council adopted a new European partnership for Bosnia, as an 
instrument of the SAP, being an ‘additional, tailored support to the Government of Bosnia 
and Herzegovina in order to realise the country’s European perspective. Its aim is to identify 
priority areas where further efforts and reforms are required, calling in particular for Bosnia 
and Herzegovina to bring its legislation into line with that of the Community.’80 From this, it 
can be concluded that the EU has kept Bosnia as a subject within its debates, but that the 
debate concerning Bosnia is still framed from an EU perspective, with the main focus being 
EU enlargement and the accession of Bosnia only from the perspective of the EU’s identity 
and the EU’s security. Due to this, the EU’s main priority is the imposition of many European 
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norms and values on the post-conflict country, without tackling the reforms that the country 
needs to develop. The EU does not examine the Bosnian perspective, because its own norms 
and values will overcome all obstacles, so seems to be its reasoning. This sounds overdone, 
but from its actions and the way Bosnia is discussed within the institutions this can be 
concluded. 
 
Bosnia has long been a subject of debate within the European institutions like the EP, the EC 
and the Council. The EU’s attitude towards Bosnia is mainly self-centred; concluding from its 
many positive words of discussion as to how much aid has already been given to Bosnia. This 
aid consists of humanitarian aid, financial aid and military support in the country. The EU was 
disappointed in the lack of cooperation from the Bosnian authorities and often discussed the 
need for reforms that have to be achieved by the Bosnian government. Although it does 
indicate that the constitution set up in Bosnia in the Dayton Agreements was a short-term 
solution, it puts the responsibility for reforms on the Bosnian authorities, who are too divided 
to find appropriate reforms for Bosnia. The only incentive that the EU can utilise in order to 
force Bosnia to reform is EU membership. The question remains of whether or not the 
democratization of Bosnia is not just for the interest of the EU. Security, image and European 
reunification are priorities for the EU. Reform of Bosnia’s constitution and finally Bosnia’s 
accession in the EU would achieve these priorities. Therefore, the bigger the EU can grow, 
the more power it will obtain.  
  A report for the Congress of the US criticizes the EU’s approach towards Bosnia. 
Steven Woehrel describes herein that the efforts of the EU to stabilize Bosnia ‘are failing’.81 
He also states that the Office of the High Representative (OHR) is not working as it was 
intended to work within Bosnia, and that the EU’s approach towards Bosnia has proved to be 
insufficient. Criticism from European perspective is given from former High Representative 
for Bosnia and Herzegovina Lord Paddy Ashdown. In an interview of the CNN he criticises 
the EU for mistreating Bosnia and having made major errors in the region. He also blamed the 
EU for the malfunctioning of the state.82 Where the EU itself takes no blame for the slow 
progress of Europeanisation, it remains to support Bosnia with several aid programmes and it 
keeps stating that Bosnia is a future candidate country. Charles-Philippe (2001) argues that 
the EU with this approach might even ‘contribute to the aggravation of the country’s 
problems’. Precisely because the EU holds on to its identity in Bosnia, it gives the Bosnian 
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politicians the space to take only some of the aspects of the Bosnian identity to push through 
their ideologies and to hold on to the maintenance of the Bosnian constitution divided along 
ethno-nationalist lines, whereby Bosnian accession to the EU remains something for the 
distant future.  
  So far, the EU’s actions in Bosnia are derived from the European perspective. Because 
of this, the actions remained insufficient, for they neglected the Bosnian identity and the fact 
that it has a different historical background and a structure aberrant of the European structure. 
The EU’s discussions on Bosnia turn out to be more out of self-interest and the security for 
the EU itself than truly effective for the development of Bosnia to be able to become a 
candidate country. Therefore the EU’s actions within Bosnia will be discussed in the next 
chapter, examining whether the spread of the EU’s norms and values is embraced in Bosnia 
and has shown effectiveness. This demonstrates if adopting the EU’s identity is in Bosnia’s 
competence. 
 
 31 
Chapter 3 - The European Union within Bosnia 
 
After the separation of Slovenia and Croatia from Yugoslavia, which left it looking more like 
a Great Serbia, Bosnia also decided to proclaim its independence. The European Union 
indicated that it would recognize Bosnia as an independent state when it would decide to 
separate from Yugoslavia.83 The recognition of an independent state in this unstable region 
was remarkable, for it seemed to indicate that the EU would support Bosnia even if this 
independence would have severe consequences. What was even more remarkable was the lack 
of mediation from the EU. Burg and Shoup (1999) argue in their book that the EU should 
have intervened from the moment that the war broke out in Croatia. However, they state, the 
intervention of the EU came too late. Naturally, the conflicts that broke out at the beginning 
of the 1990s in former Yugoslavia did not go unnoticed in the international community. Many 
different peace plans were set up.84 As the conflict was concerned with the issues of 
governance and ethnicity, most of the peace plans failed.85  
  The involvement of the EU within Bosnia did already exist during the war. 
Nevertheless, Burg and Shoup argue that the EU was too divided to be able to construct  a 
common peace plan. Missing the common strength, the EU was not able to get negotiations 
off the ground.86 Until the final agreements, the Americans had never given ‘full backing’ to 
the European peace plans, which made it hard to come to a compromise.87 As the US started 
to take charge in the peace progress, noticing the constant failures, the Dayton Accords were 
finally signed and peace was founded in Bosnia.  
  The Dayton Accords that were finally agreed on by all three warring parties were seen 
as ‘the least bad solution.’88 It was seen as a short term solution to end the war. Within Bosnia 
the influence of the international actors was noticed, for with the signing of the Dayton 
Accords the bloodshed came to an end.89 The presidents that were in power at the end of the 
war were the same as at the beginning, and therefore tensions between the three ethnicities 
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were not diminished.90  
  Twenty years later Bosnia has signed several agreements and partnerships with the 
EU, but the constitution is still modelled on the Dayton agreement. As Toal (2006) stated on 
the EU, it was: “determined more to end the war in BiH than to establish the basis for a 
viable and sustainable state.”91  
Protests in Bosnia erupted earlier in 2014, which showed the current state of discontent 
among Bosnian citizens.  The protesters in Bosnia are frustrated because of the high rate of 
unemployment, but while the EU has always been an example of wealth and prosperity, none 
of the protesters advocated EU membership.92 The fact that the EU is not a subject of debate 
in the protests shows the lack of credibility in the EU’s capacity to reform the constitution in 
Bosnia. As written above, the EU places the ultimate responsibility upon the local authorities 
in Bosnia, but what has been the EU’s responsibility in the years after the war to the present?   
György Konrad argues that the EU has the wrong attitude. First, it recognises Bosnia’s 
independence but then it does not know how to solve the divisions and problems.93  
  To see what influence the EU has on the Bosnian constitution and how the EU is 
perceived within Bosnia, the EU’s proceedings in Bosnia will be elaborated upon step by step 
by analyses and discussion. This chapter will start with the Dayton agreement and the role of 
the High Representative in Bosnia. Furthermore, the EU programmes like EUFOR, CARDS, 
SAP and IPA will be discussed and analysed. The EU’s actions within Bosnia can only be 
effective if it takes the Bosnian identity into consideration. The definition of this identity is 
yet hard to capture. Juncos (2005) describes this as following: 
 
“If the Balkans stand in a liminal position – between the West and the East, as 
part of Europe but at the same time located at its periphery- BiH would be at 
the core of this representation of the Balkans. Between three religions and 
three nations, BiH is on the borderline between Western and Eastern cultures, 
the best and the worst of the ‘imaginary’ Balkans meet on this small territory. 
However, neither ideal multicultural coexistence in BiH before the war nor 
                                               
90 Burg & Shoup (1999) The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Ethnic conflict and International intervention, ME Sharpe 
91 Toal, G. ao. (2006) Bosnia-Herzegovina ten years after Dayton: constitutional change and public opinion, Eurasian Geography and 
Economics, 47, no. 1, p. 61-75 
92 Bassuener, K. and Weber, B. (2014) report from democratization policy council, DPC Sarajevo-Berlin 
93 Konrad, G. (1999) De oorlog in Joegoslavië (en wat erna kan komen), Van Gennep Amsterdam 
 33 
negative stereotyping of violent “Balkans” can capture the truth.”94  
 
The true Bosnian identity is therefore between the multicultural society and the violent 
features of the Balkans. Because it is a country with different religions and ethnicities, it is not 
only a divided country, but at the same time the Bosnian population is most diverse of the 
Balkans with regard to different ethnicities.95 The Bosnian identity is therefore complicated to 
examine, but as discussed in chapter two, the EU does not take into consideration this 
identity. Therefore, the identity of the EU can be explained, as in chapter one. The influence 
of the programmes of the EU in Bosnia and the main instruments that the EU has in Bosnia 
can be discussed and analysed. From this, the effectiveness of these programmes can thus also 
be analysed.  
  One of the main instruments of the EU within Bosnia is the European Union Special 
Representative in Bosnia and Herzegovina (EUSR).96 In essence, the role of the Special 
Representative is to help Bosnian authorities implement the reforms that were agreed upon 
between Bosnia and the EU. The EUSR offers EU advice for Bosnia in order to help it 
achieve EU membership. The EUSR keeps the EC informed on how the process of reforms is 
developing and therefore keeps the pressure high on Bosnian officials.97 This means that 
Europe, or at least ‘the West’, has had a lot of control within Bosnia since the war. 
  The first EUSR, which is at present simultaneously the HR, was named in March 
2001. This was the British politician Lord Paddy Ashdown. Since the Bosnian politicians 
could not settle on the required reforms, the EUSR instead took the decision and imposed the 
reforms on them in order to take care of the gridlock. This imposition of the reforms made the 
negotiations for the, inter alia, SAA possible in October 2005.98  
  The HR or the Office of the HR (OHR) has been criticized by many analysts. 
According to Stewart (2006) the role of the HR might be the main obstacle for the reforms in 
Bosnia.99 Majstorovic (2007) criticizes the Office of the High Representative for being 
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arrogant. He feels the OHR drives a wedge between the West and the Balkans for talking 
about the ‘we’ and ‘them’, as described above.100 As Brljavac states, the main reason that the 
role of the EUSR is often perceived to be inefficient has been due to the vague position of the 
EU on the Bosnian crisis.101 When, in the beginning of 2009, the HR/EUSR Lajcak 
unexpectedly resigned after describing his job several times as ‘riding a dead horse’ , the 
position of EUSR was disputed. One of the reports of the International Crisis Group stated: 
“There is some reluctance in Brussels for taking up such responsibilities, especially if its 
means deployment of the largest ever EUSR office, and increased EC funding.” (2007:27)102  
A report on the current issues in Bosnia for the Congress, prepared by a specialist in European 
Affairs in January 2013, shows that the HR remains inefficient due to the EU’s attitude. It 
argues:  
 
“It has the power to fire Bosnian officials and impose laws, if need be, to 
enforce the Dayton Accords. However, the international community has proved 
unwilling in recent years to back the High Representative in using these 
powers boldly, fearing a backlash among Bosnian Serb leaders.”103  
 
This report therefore does not criticise the role of the HR in Bosnia, but the willingness of the 
international community to support its job. This is discussed by more analysts, like 
Bassenauer and Tzifakis, who state that it is not specifically the presence of the HR in Bosnia 
that is the problem, but the EU authorities. The EU’s attitude remains vague, lacking a clear 
approach towards Bosnia. The EU does implement law through the HR, but is thereafter 
fearful for the consequences. If the EU does not condemn the Bosnian leaders more severely, 
but deals with them from its identity and therefore negotiates, the EU cannot place the HR in 
Bosnia without a clear notion of what the HR can and cannot do. This way, the EU’s actions 
can never become effective, being too contradictory. In the 2004 report of National Integrity 
Systems of the Transparency International, this contradictory attitude is designated as well. 
The way the EU behaves in Bosnia through the HR is in contradiction with its 
democratisation values: 
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“The High Representative has demonstrated that he can bring charges against 
any individual in BiH without presenting sufficient (or any) evidence and that 
the entire process of ‘democratic’ elections comes close to being a farce. 
Dispossessing legal entities of their funds without a proper public investigation 
and a trial would be classified as theft in any Western democracy.”104 
 
The role of the HR and therewith the EU remains therefore questionable. However, the OHR 
is still in function and according to Basseanauer (2014) this is necessary as long as the EU is 
in its way in the stabilisation of Bosnia. Bassenauer (2014) states that as long as Bosnia and 
the EU stick to the commitments and agreements made in the Dayton Accords, the OHR 
should stay in order to maintain some stability within Bosnia.105 Yet this can only work if the 
EU recognizes its constant initiative and supports its own policies in Bosnia. 
  The first EU initiative after the war was at the end of 1996 and occurred during the 
French presidency, and was mainly concerned with stabilization and peace building in the 
region. This first initiative was called the Royaumont Process.106 According to Brljacav (2011) 
this initiative together with the PHARE and OBNOVA humanitarian programmes was a clear 
proof that the EU and its member states had changed their approach towards Bosnia. As 
Brljavac states, the EU went from: “[a] previously held passive, weak and incoherent to a 
more active, dynamic and united approach.”107  
These aid programmes fit with the EU’s identity which intends to spread its norms and values, 
not imposing democracy, but giving aid that allows Bosnia to build a democracy of its own.  
  In June 1998 the EU-BiH Consultative Task Force was established.108 In Brljavac’s 
words, this task force was to provide advice in several areas, such as in the judiciary, 
education, media, administration and the economy. In the same month EU and Bosnian 
officials signed the “Declaration of Special Relations between EU and BiH”.109 As the EU 
began the Stabilisation and Association Process with Bosnia, it was the main international 
player within Bosnia, surpassing the US, NATO and UN. 110111 To help Bosnia fulfil the 
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demands within the SAP, the EU provided a new programme called CARDS (Community 
Assistance for Reconstruction, Development and Stabilisation). This satisfied several 
humanitarian aid programmes like the OBNOVA and Phare regulation. The CARDS 
programme was replaced in early 2007 by the Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance 
(IPA).112  
  In January 2003 the EU replaced the UN’s International Police Task Force with an EU 
Police Mission (EUPM).113 The EUPM is in control of the Bosnian police. It monitors, 
mentors and inspects the work of the Bosnian police.114 In December 2004 the EU replaced 
the NATO’s SFOR mission with its peacekeeping military operation.115 Therefore, the EU 
Monitoring Mission (EUMM) is monitoring developments on political and security levels, 
and this way the Commission guides the country towards possible EU accession. As Chandler 
puts it, Bosnia is: “the first genuine EU state where sovereignty has in effect been transferred 
to Brussels.”116 Chandler thus states here that the EU is taking over, without taking into 
consideration the sovereignty of Bosnia. Taking over the country’s sovereignty is not an 
effective way to stimulate Bosnia to become a properly functioning democracy.  
  In 2008 plans were made to close the OHR, due to the many criticisms of the OHR for 
being ‘undemocratic’ and ‘unaccountable’, which contradicted the demands of the European 
Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).117 Again, this contradiction contributes to the 
declining credibility. To build on this credibility, the EU took over the responsibility for the 
HR and combined its functions together with the EUSR to be for one individual.118  It 
appointed a new HR, calling it a ‘reinforced, single EU Representative’.119 Whereas Stewart 
argued that the main obstacle for the EU within Bosnia is this doubtful role of the HR, 
Tzifakis argues that the problems with the HR are only a sideshow. He argues that the main 
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problems that Bosnia has with the EU is the constant lack of a common position between EU 
officials and the member states.120 This contributes to the vagueness of EU policy in Bosnia. 
Having no common position on Bosnia can not result in effective Europeanisation.  
  The EU uses its soft power in Bosnia spreading its norms and values and so far it 
resulted in a vague position of the EU in Bosnia, lacking credibility. However, the EU uses its 
‘hard power’ as well, for it still has the EUFOR Althea in existence within Bosnia. EUFOR 
Althea is a peacekeeping force in Bosnia under EU command. It is set up to support Bosnian 
reform efforts, and to secure a safe environment in Bosnia.121 The European Military Force 
had about 2000 troops in Bosnia around 2010, being located mainly just outside Sarajevo and 
throughout Bosnia.122 The EUFOR Althea mission of the EU is planning on retreating from 
Bosnia, handing over command of the military to the Bosnians. However, although this has 
been in progress since 2004, the EUFOR has still not yet fully left Bosnia. Even in the 
application of its military power the EU remains vague. Thereby, the EU not leaving Bosnia 
shows the lack of trust there is between the EU and the Bosnian authorities. With Dayton still 
in function, the constitution will not change by itself. In an attempt to adjust the outdated 
Dayton, the EU organised negotiations in Camp Butmir, the so-called Butmir talks. They 
failed.123 The EU was blamed for not preparing the negotiations properly and for not being 
aware enough of the sensitiveness of constitutional reform within Bosnia, whereas the 
Bosnian politicians were blamed for not cooperating sufficiently, and for being unwilling to 
compromise. Džihić and Wieser (2011) argue that the EU was again only focusing on the 
political leaders of the main three ethnic groups. Thereby they state that the EU did not have a 
meaningful package for the Butmir talks that was, small as it was, nevertheless rejected by the 
Bosnian leaders.124  
  In June 2012, the EU launched the High Level Dialogue on the Accession Process in 
Bosnia, another initiative to support Bosnia on its way to accession. This High Level 
Dialogue was set up to help Bosnia ‘understand’ how to prepare for EU reforms.125  
  From research carried out by the Commission’s delegation in Bosnia in 2004, it was 
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revealed that a majority of the Bosnian population favoured EU membership.126 However, it 
seems that after years of division and indistinctness in the EU’s attitude towards Bosnia, and 
due to the relatively small amount of change the country has known despite of all the 
agreements, partnerships and regulations, Bosnian citizens no longer desire EU membership, 
as described by Bassenauer.127 The EU has arguably the most influence on Bosnia compared 
to the rest of the world. Within Bosnia, it is perceived that the situation changes very little, but 
a lot of action is carried out by the EU, taking into account all of the aid programmes and 
agreements that have been made, as discussed above. This way, as Tzifakis states:  
 
“Bosnian leaders have come to believe that the conditions for EU membership 
would be ‘infinitely negotiable’ (…).  The Bosnians learned that if they were 
‘persistent enough’, the EU would ‘sooner or later give up’ on its requirements 
and reward obstruction.”128  
 
What Tzifakis is saying is that Bosnian authorities have come to understand that although the 
Bosnian constitution is still built upon the out-dated short term solution of the Dayton 
Accords, the EU keeps supporting the country and negotiations continue. The EU estimated a 
budget for political and economic reform aid under the IPA in 2013 of 111.8 million Euros.129  
  This constant progress of negotiating seems to bring fatigue to the EU. Although the 
EU is asking for reforms and adherence to the EU norms and values, it keeps negotiating with 
the three presidents of Bosnia. The role that the HR/EUSR fulfils is one of total control over 
the acts of Bosnian authorities, leaving no room for democracy. The so-called democracy 
promoted by the EU will not be a democracy like those of its member states as long as 
Bosnian politicians do not receive full responsibility. The fact that the EU is promoting EU 
norms and values, of which equality is one, in a country where only three ethnicities are able 
to take part in the government, is contradictory. The EU and Bosnia have had a serious 
relationship on the economic and political level for almost twenty years now. The 
Europeanization process of Bosnia should have developed in these years, making Bosnia a 
more stable and growing country. However, it seems Bosnia has not come closer to becoming 
an EU member state other than on paper. This paradox leads to a lack of credibility of the EU. 
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All the EU programmes in Bosnia can only be serviceable and effective if the prospect is 
credible. This lack of credibility is discussed by several analysts on the EU in Bosnia. 
Brljavac (2011) argues that this ‘credibility crisis’ is due to the way the EU presents itself. He 
states that the EU member states and institutions are too divided to come to a common 
position towards Bosnia.130   
   When looking into the role of the EU within Bosnia, credibility is crucial. Brljavac 
(2011) discusses this credibility gap as well, arguing that this is created by the failures of so 
many EU strategies for Bosnia. The only successes the EU had thus far, according to 
Brljavac, are the ‘new stage agencies, police reform, and visa liberalisation’.131 This lack of 
credibility in the EU from Bosnians displays the position of the EU within Bosnia. When the 
OHR, in its speech in 2005, discussed the constitutional change Bosnia had to achieve, it 
actually shifted the responsibility to the Bosnian authorities: 
 
“...a central element of the first stage of constitutional reform has to be a 
transfer of responsibilities from the Entities to BiH by means of amendments to 
the BiH progress is to be achieved in the process of European integration 
(OHR press release 2005b)”132 
 
 The question that still arises from this is of course, what is meant here by ‘BiH’. The Bosnian 
politicians were still, here ten years after the war, divided in ethnicity. The paradox in the 
EU’s attitude towards Bosnia lies in the reforms it asks Bosnia to achieve, while at the same 
time not considering the Bosnian government as a government to negotiate with.  
 The role of the EU in Bosnia is based upon the principle of conditionality, the only 
weapon the EU uses towards Bosnia. This conditionality approach can only work if the 
Bosnian authorities and people are motivated by potential EU membership. But, as argued 
above, if the EU keeps on negotiating and delivering more agreements, the EU’s approach can 
turn against itself. The reforms achieved thus far show that the relationship between the EU 
and Bosnia is still moving, but the question is of whether this moving relationship is 
developing as well. As a direct neighbour of the EU, Bosnia can still have a constitution 
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divided into several ethnicities, discriminating minorities at the same time. The principle of 
conditionality cannot come to full potential when dealing with Bosnian authorities that do not 
have EU membership as their priority.133 The EU in Bosnia is consequently almost only ‘seen’ 
by the Bosnian politicians, who interpret the EU standards in their own way. However, 
Brljavac argues that Europeanization is not only just implementing the EU standards. It is also 
a responsibility of the EU to set clear standards and to send out a clear message.134 Brljavac 
quotes Anastasakis and Bechev to support one of the arguments why this is not working well: 
 
“the criteria and benefits of (EU) conditionality must be visible not just to the 
elites but also to the citizens, in order to sustain momentum for reform along 
the long and difficult road to accession.”135  
 
Basically, Brljavac blames both parties for the shortcomings and argues that the 
responsibilities for both the EU as for the Bosnian authorities have to be clearly defined in 
order to prevent ‘political manipulation’.136 He does not deny that pressure from the EU 
towards Bosnian politicians is needed, but recognizes that the EU’s conditionality is not 
sufficient for the local authorities in Bosnia. A combination of a strong EU and of a 
commitment by domestic politicians is ‘crucial’ to be able to really achieve development and 
reform.137 Although a majority of the Bosnian population seems to welcome the 
Europeanization process (Bosniaks 97 percent, Bosnian Croats 78 percent, Bosnian Serbs 78 
percent), so far the Bosnian agenda is not yet set on the “European agenda”, according to 
Brljavac. The EU keeps intensifying its support, without clear development within Bosnia. It 
can be argued that there has therefore been a certain development in Bosnia, namely the 
growing EU interference. It seems however that this does not lead to a more common and 
clear strategy for the country, instead leading to a complete ‘disappointment’.138 Granting 
‘Europeanisation’ and democracy to Bosnian politicians may not lead to the demanded 
reforms, but the EU is directing financial aid to Bosnia as well, something that “would 
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motivate domestic politicians to implement necessary measures that Brussels has set.”139 
However, it seems that this has the opposite effect. The Bosnian authorities have learned over 
the years that change is not needed in order for the EU to continue with its financial aid and 
other EU programmes.  
  Keeping in mind that the EU’s norms and values are a main priority, it is not 
surprising that the credibility gap seems to grow, rather than to close. If this credibility gap is 
growing, the principle of conditionality loses power, weakening the whole power of the EU. 
Considering the amount of the instruments used by the EU in Bosnia, it seems so far that most 
analysts criticize the EU’s approach and blame the EU’s ‘vagueness’ for the instability in 
Bosnia and its slow progress. However, Bose (2005) argues that ‘the Bosnian society would 
have been worse off without the international community in its midst’, and also argues that it 
is not solely Dayton that is to blame for the current fragile situation, but that there are other 
important factors.  Bose does not deny the unfeasible institutional structure of the Bosnian 
state, but he does state it is not the main reason for its condition. Factors that are more 
important for Bosnia’s precarious situation are according to Bose:  
 
“the extremely poor quality of post-secondary education that, coupled with 
poor job prospects, encourages emigration by bright young people who want to 
make something of their life; and the extremely low calibre of the political 
class, which is ineffective more because of incompetence than inter-ethnic 
wrangling.”140  
 
Of course Bose has a point here, because with a lack of education quality and poor job 
prospects, it is tempting to find one’s luck abroad. However, the fact that the constitution set 
up in Dayton highlights ethnic differences means that all of the reforms that need to take place 
either take too long or fail before they begin. If there is no good example for the Bosnian 
people from above, it makes change and improvement extremely challenging. The 
effectiveness of the EU programs will be affected by this result.  
  Like Tzifakis argued above, Brljavac (2011) states that Bosnian politicians have 
learned over the years that the EU’s support to Bosnia does not lose any strength despite the 
slow progress that Bosnia makes towards the demanded reforms. Brljavac blames this slow 
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progress on the local politicians of all three ethnic communities, saying that they are: 
“interpreting the European standards and criteria according to their so-called ‘Bosnian 
standards’ built in particularistic ideological interests.” 141 
  Even with all the EU programmes and prospect of EU membership not leading to 
more solidarity, the Bosnian authorities take advantage of the support and try to play each 
other off. The attitude towards the EU from Bosnian perspective is multifaceted, for every 
party has its own interests. According to the report by the Nansen Dialogue Center Sarajevo 
(NDC) and Saferworld concerning the situation in Bosnia in 2010, it is mostly the Bosniaks 
who are in favour of the EU maintaining its powers in Bosnia, whereas the Bosnian Serbs are 
accusing “the OHR of abusing its powers, and refuse to comply with many of its demands”, 
and they want the EU to leave Bosnia to the Bosnians.142 The report states that Bosnian 
politicians can be motivated by public frustration, provided that this frustration is sensible. On 
the visa liberalisation issue the report states that:  
 
“The EU’s decision not to grant visa liberalisation to BiH in November 2009 
prompted a brief flurry of activity by BiH politicians to meet the benchmark 
criteria, which resulted in visa liberalisation finally being granted in May 
2010. Local politicians were no doubt motivated by significant public 
frustration at the failure to meet the criteria the first time round, combined with 
the upcoming general elections. While EU staff point to this process as an 
example of the impact of the ‘soft power’ of EU accession, sceptics argue that 
this was a unique situation, and that it is difficult to identify issues which might 
have a similarly mobilising effect in the foreseeable future.”143  
 
The report thus takes no stand here, but shows that although pressure from the public was felt, 
this could be a unique situation, where visa liberalisation is an important aspect to ‘belong’ to 
Europe and the EU’s member states without being a member. For the Bosnian politicians it is 
not an advantage to make progress towards EU membership, for it would decrease their power 
in Bosnia, which is based on ethnic identity.144 This means that the EU strategies, mostly 
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concerning the EU integration process, cannot be sufficient. The EU’s actions are structured 
by its identity and goals. These goals however differ from the Bosnian politicians intentions. 
These different identities clash and progress is not being made. This contributes to the 
continuing ineffectiveness of the EU’s actions in Bosnia.  
 When looking into the role the EU plays in Bosnia, it is clear that the EU has a number 
of instruments that exist in Bosnia. Although it has been criticized and plans are in the making 
to abolish its existence in Bosnia, the OHR/EUSR plays an important role within Bosnia. The 
powers of the HR are wide, for it not only supports the Bosnian politicians, it also can impose 
reforms on them or even fire Bosnian authorities. This can contribute to the credibility gap 
that exists. According to several researches that have been carried out, Bosnians lost 
confidence in the EU over the years. Despite the fact that all of the EU led initiatives, 
according to Bose, have led to a better and more secure life in Bosnia than would have been 
without the EU, Bosnians still feel that the EU lacks a common policy towards their 
country.145 From this, Bosnian leaders can take advantage in order to win the people. The 
paradox that comes with the EU policies in Bosnia (promoting democracy while imposing 
laws) has led to the credibility gap that made the principle of conditionality a weak weapon. 
Without real sanctions towards Bosnian politicians, the hope for real change coming from the 
EU is diminishing. Protests like those that took place early 2014 therefore seem to focus on 
constitutional change from within the people, leaving the inter-ethnic government and the EU 
as outsiders. So far, the effectiveness of the EU’s actions in Bosnia has proven to be 
insufficient, but they have not been idle since the Dayton Agreements. To see to what extent 
Bosnia has taken over the EU’s norms and values and therewith Europeanised, changing 
identity to a European one, the next chapter will discuss and analyse Bosnia’s 
democratisation.   
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Chapter - 4 Bosnia’s democratisation 
 
The EU has imposed democracy on Bosnia. Despite the fact that this is a contradiction, the 
fact that Bosnia is said to be a democracy since the establishment of peace proves that this can 
be imposed on a country. Of course, the situation is more complicated than this. As the war 
was raging in Bosnia, the only thing that was important for the international community was 
to stop the fighting and bloodshed.  The EU realised that in its promotion for democracy and 
cooperation it could not ignore a country at war located within Europe.  The EU’s actions are 
led by the EU’s structure, recorded in its foundation. The EU thus forms its actions by its 
culture, norms, institutions, procedures, rules and social practices.146 This is transferred by its 
actions to Bosnia, or at least that is the idea of the EU’s enlargement.  
  With the Dayton Agreement, Bosnia’s constitution was set up along the lines of a 
power-sharing model, being a short term solution to satisfy all warring parties. This short term 
solution for peace plays a part in the slow progress that Bosnia has made towards 
Europeanisation. Here, the development of the democratisation process in Bosnia will be 
discussed and analyses will be made of in what way this progress has failed or succeeded, and 
how the EU could have provided better support to reform the constitutions set up in Dayton.  
  Since the first elections held in the 1990s, Bosnia’s constitution has been dominated 
by ethno-nationalist parties.147 In 2000, one exception occurred when a multi-national party 
won the elections. Brljavac (2011) hence argues that it was not a ‘democratic transition’ that 
occurred in Bosnia, but rather an ‘ethnocratic transition’. He quotes Mujkić (2007) who 
explains why it is better called an ethnocratic transition: 
 
“I call a community characterized by the political priority of the ethnic 
group(s) over the individual that is implemented through democratic self-
legislation, and a community characterized by the political priority of the 
ethnic group’s right to self-determination over the citizen’s right to self-
determination where the citizen’s membership in a political community is 
determined by her or his membership in ethnic community, Ethnopolis. And I 
call the political narrative and practice intended to justify this ethnically-based 
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social construct, ethnopolitics.”148  
 
The constitution in Bosnia is built upon ethnic division, an element that was added in the 
Dayton Agreements, which makes it easier for nationalist parties to defend their position in 
Bosnia. Although it was clear from the beginning that Dayton was a short term solution, hope 
in the support of the EU was strong for it was the figurehead of democracy and the protector 
of human rights.149 In 1998, the democratisation process of Bosnia was in its early stages and 
many saw its future as bright. Chandler (1998) discusses the future of Bosnia. He argues that 
the constitution only takes into account the Bosnian politicians, while ignoring the Bosnian 
people: 
 
“While the Bosnian politicians are fully accountable to the international 
community, there are no mechanisms making international policy-making 
accountable to the Bosnian people”150 
 
This shows the lack of responsibility taken by the EU. Instead of pumping money into an 
immature democracy, the EU has to make sure it addresses itself to the Bosnian people and 
taking into account that the Bosnian authorities are misusing the EU’s reputation. It has to be 
accountable to the Bosnian people, instead of demanding accountability of the Bosnian 
leaders, of whom it showed they do not progress.   
 The EU however, still deals with the complex constitution of Bosnia, making the 
spreading of its norms and values burdensome. Bosnia is divided into two entities. The 
Republika Srpska (RS), meaning literally the Serbian Republic, and the Bosniak/Croat 
Federation of BiH (FBiH), primarily ruled by the Bosniaks and Bosnian Croats. The FBiH is 
divided into three levels: the entity level, the cantonal level and the municipal level. The RS 
has municipalities. 151 To discuss the complexity of the Bosnian composition of its 
constitution, Jung points out the design of the institutions: The central institutions of Bosnia 
have a rotating presidency with three members of a different ethnicity, being a Bosniak, a 
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Bosnian Croat and a Bosnian Serb. The Bosnian constitution also knows The House of 
Peoples, The House of Representatives and The Council of Ministers. The House of Peoples 
has fifteen members, two-thirds from FBiH and one-third from the RS. These delegates are 
named by the upper house of the FBiH and by the National Assembly of the RS. The House 
of Peoples is thus represented by five Bosniaks, five Bosnian Croats and five Bosnian Serbs. 
The House of Representatives consists of 42 members, again with two-thirds from the FBiH 
and one-third from the RS. Finally, the Council of Ministers is designated by the Chair of the 
Council of Ministers and authorized by the House of Representatives. The Deputy Ministers 
are selected from another ethnicity than their corresponding ministers. The presidents and a 
majority of delegates can proclaim their veto. These central institutions are then subdivided 
into the entities, which both have power-sharing institutions at the regional level.152 Jung 
shows that the FBiH has a similar model as the central Bosnian constitution:  
 
“a joint presidency, with a Bosniak and a Bosnian Croat as president and vice-
president; the House of the Peoples, which includes 30 Bosniaks, 30 Bosnian 
Croats, and up to 14 ‘others’, selected by the Cantonal Assemblies; and the 
Federation House of Representatives, composed of 140 elected members based 
on proportional representation. The RS also selects its own president and vice-
president, as well as the 83 members that make up the RS National 
Assembly.”153  
 
This complex structure of the Bosnian constitution alone is likely to bring about some 
problems and here the division in ethnicities comes on top of it. The first elections that were 
held in Bosnia after the war took place in 1996 and it was therefore not a surprise that it was 
won by the three main ethnic parties.154 The nationalist parties could easily take advantage of 
this and use their powers as ascribed in Dayton to counter real change and progress for 
Bosnia. The reaction of the EU was to increase the powers of the OHR in order to have some 
control over the radical parties. The OHR could now fire representatives that were hindering 
the process of the Dayton implementation.155 With this deep involvement it is hard for the EU 
to take a step back, for the nationalist parties use their power accurately. To summarise, the 
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EU and Bosnia are connected, but do both not speak with one ‘voice’. The identities differ 
and both act from their own structures. Having so many different layers of government within 
the two bodies itself, the relationship brings about inefficiency and problems. Instead of 
discussing problems that occur in the population, like the increase of the unemployment rate 
and the low quality of education, political parties are playing on the peoples feelings by 
discussing ethnicity.156 Besides, both sides are occupied with imposing their own idea of a 
proper society. According to Kurt Bassenauer this leads to an ‘ideal environment’ for 
nationalist politicians in Bosnia and is due to the ‘EU’s bureaucratic autism’.157 Without real 
consideration of the Bosnian people, the EU seems to constantly react to the decisions made 
by the Bosnian politicians. The democracy in Bosnia is not led by the EU, for the parties 
elected lead the presidency, but Bosnia is under EU control. The EU does not take full 
responsibility, but keeps on trying to negotiate with the same politicians it criticizes.158 The 
constitution is outdated and needs reform. The EU recognizes this, but it has been found that 
with the principle of conditionality it cannot exert enough pressure on the Bosnian politicians. 
The ‘destructive agendas’ of the Bosnian politicians and the different views for Bosnia by the 
same politicians and the EU have led to the slow development and impediment of the reform 
progress. As Bassenauer states: “it led to a total blockade of institutions in the ethnically 
divided town and canton of Mostar, where no elections have taken place for eight years.”159 
This indicates that pressure should be applied in a different way or from a different angle. The 
EU accuses the Bosnian citizens of not taking enough responsibility during elections in 
‘punishing’ the parties. The division in ethnicity in Bosnia is also maintained by the choices 
of the Bosnian population, argues the EU according to Bassenauer. For Bosnian citizens, 
Bassenauer states: “these exhortations to take responsibility for their own misfortune seen like 
blaming the victim.”160  
 Jung argues that the constant intervention of the OHR obstructs the development of 
Bosnia in becoming a multi-ethnic society without emphasizing this division. He states that 
the division of ethnicities is not only bolstered by the war, but particularly by the post-war 
decisions that have been made, by the Bosnian authorities as well as by the EU. The power-
sharing approach may thus be a short term solution for warring parties, but it is not 
sustainable and therefore not workable in order to be able to build a stable democracy. The 
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constitution set up in Dayton therefore brings more problems for the country than it does 
solve the division. As Chandler puts it:  
 
“This meant that the newly-elected state and entity governments were reduced 
to little more than rubber-stamps for predetermined international policies.”161  
 
The power-sharing model used in Bosnia to keep the peace and to stimulate development for 
the Democratisation progress was the only way to get the Dayton Agreement signed. 
However, as Jung (2012) argues: ‘power-sharing does not automatically lead to 
democracy’.162 As described by Zahar (2001) the negotiated settlement after a war is often a 
power sharing model, for it is the only solution that warring parties can agree upon. However, 
she argues, this usually ends in a failure and is therefore ‘limited’.163 Power-sharing as 
terminal for a democracy in progress seems not to be an option. Jung argues that it is never 
the right solution in a post-war country divided in ethnicities, because when the power sharing 
model for a country is agreed upon, there is hardly a way back. Bosnian politicians can hold 
on to the excuses of power-sharing and the constitution set up by the international actors.  
    The democratisation process in Bosnia after the war has from its beginning been 
supervised by the EU. By taking care of Bosnia, the EU has taken responsibility. By not 
correcting Bosnian politicians enough and by hiding behind the Dayton Agreement, the EU is 
partly responsible for the slow progress Bosnia makes. As Dziewulska states: “If the EU 
wants to pull back and really considers Bosnia a candidate state, the change of its 
constitution should be its priority.”164  However, limiting action to just changing the 
constitution seems short-sighted. After negotiations imposed from above succeed, the 
question still remains of what politicians will make of it. Bieber (2009) blames the EU for 
acting too dramatically, and for focusing too much on the need for Bosnia to change. 
Organizing negotiations carries the idea of a deadlock, Bieber argues. Bieber analyses:  
 
“(this)… also reinforces a sense of ‘everything is falling apart’ which has a 
way to become a self-fulfilling prophecy. Opening constitutional questions in 
such a dramatic way also is what larger parts of the elite like – it is these big 
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issues which lend themselves so much more to defending national interests, 
than everyday boring politics.”165  
 
The EU’s attitude, Bieber argues, does not improve the Bosnian perspective of a well-
functioning democracy, it only worsens it. At the end of the war Bosnia was to some extent 
‘wealthy’.166 Jung argues that the main conducive conditions needed for the rebuilding of the 
country and the construction of a democracy were present in Bosnia, being: “per capita 
income was $2188 in 1995, and the economy grew at an average annual rate of 22.3% for the 
first five years after the war.”167 Although statistics are not fully reliable for many 
unregistered activities, the EU’s attitude remains negative about the democratisation process 
in Bosnia. Therefore, the peace missions have a negative impact, assuming the negative 
identity of Bosnia. The question arises of whether the EU’s actions would have been more 
effective if its attitude towards Bosnia would be more focused on the positive developments 
Bosnia has gone through since the war. Now, the Bosnian leaders can point fingers to the EU 
and maintain their power based on differences of ethnicity, the self-fulfilling prophecy Bieber 
designates. 
 Another aspect that is often blamed for the ineffectiveness of the EU’s actions in 
Bosnia is the corruption that Bosnia experiences.168 To counter the corruption in Bosnia, 
several programmes were set up by the EU. The EUHR Lord Paddy Ashdown strongly 
supported these programmes. His period as HR confirmed this. Ashdown fired several 
politicians between 2002 and 2006 under the guise of the anti-corruption programme. 
According to Chandler (2006) Ashdown’s rules were much stricter than those applied to the 
EU democracies, but according to the OHR all actions of the HR were justifiable, for Bosnia 
urgently required transparency. Chandler quotes Ashdown who stated at the time: 
 
“The truth is, as we all know, that BiH’s institutions still have to win the trust 
of their citizens. And one of the reasons for that distrust, as every citizen 
knows, is the dangerously close connection between criminality and politics, as 
well as the high levels of corruption in BiH’s political structures and 
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governmental institutions. None of this is to say that any individual is guilty of 
the indictments laid against them. It is merely to assert that, if BiH is to win the 
trust of its citizens, without which no secure form of government or stable 
peace can be established, then, in choosing which standards are appropriate to 
BiH, only the highest will do (Ahsdown, 2005)”169  
 
Even supposing that these arguments Ashdown puts forward were true, assuming that 
Bosnia’s political atmosphere is closely linked to criminality and corruption, the OHR never 
produced a report documenting this corruption in Bosnia.170 Although estimations are made on 
the basis of the budget deficit that there is an annual loss of approximately 230 million US 
dollars, other countries in Central and Eastern Europe share these estimates. Regarding the 
claim about Bosnia that ‘Bosnian authorities may be using the foreign donations to make up 
for income the government has lost to crime’, the losses made in the EU because of 
smuggling are not considered to be corruption. Chandler criticizes the OHR and the 
international community for assuming the link between Bosnian politicians and criminality.171 
This again is expecting Bosnia’s identity to be one of the ‘dirt, corrupted and hatred of the 
Balkans.’172 This places the EU’s identity with its democracy, rule of law and acting as 
guardian of human rights above the Bosnian identity, giving the EU a free hand to impose 
their ‘goodness’ to the corrupt Bosnia. As Bieber described, this can also lead to a ‘vicious 
circle’, and doesn’t focus on where the real problems are173. According to Chandler, the OHR 
has no real evidence and the claim they are mainly engaged is slander. As Chandler puts it: 
“…, there is no evidence that Bosnia is, in this regard, any different from any 
other Western state, and certainly no evidence that the problem is in any way 
exceptional. Detailed investigative evidence is scarce.”174  
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170 Idem.  
171 Idem.  
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It seems however that the EU feels the only way to get the Bosnian population behind EU 
integration and to increase the pressure for reforms is the joint fight against corruption. In the 
election campaigns however, all Bosnian parties claim to fight against corruption and the anti-
corruption programmes of the EU just cause a wider gap between the EU and the criticized 
nationalist parties.175 All in all the difficult relationship between the EU and Bosnia seem to 
slow the reform progress and the power of attraction has proved to be insufficient as an 
impetus for Bosnia to consider reform of Dayton. According to Bieber (2011) the EU has a 
limited capacity in dealing with Bosnia.176 Bosnia seems not to be able to progress with 
reforms mainly due to conflicting interests. Despite the fact that Bosnia is populated by 
multiple ethnicities, nationalist parties keep succeeding in keeping the focus on the wrong 
issues.  
As Bieber states it: “(…) especially as these elites often are only superficially committed to 
EU integration and have interest in proving the dysfunctional nature of the minimalist 
states.”177  
 
The democratisation process in Bosnia continues moving because of the EU and at the same 
time it is not able to develop because of the EU. This contradictory data is synonymous for 
the EU’s attitude. Because the EU is only acting from its own structure and the idea that it has 
to spread its norms and values in order to create  stability on its borders, it treats Bosnia as a 
country desperately in need of democracy and the EU’s identity. This approach is wrong, for 
Bosnia has its own history and identity and therefore the EU’s actions can not be effective.  
 
 
 
Bosnia’s future 
As protests broke out in Bosnia early 2014, the EU’s hope for more involvement of the 
Bosnian citizens, and the will for change to come from the bottom-up, seemed to come true. 
Despite the fact that the EU has ultimate control in Bosnia with the support it has given 
Bosnia and the role of the OHR, Venneri (2007) summarizes the only solution there seems to 
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be at hand for Bosnia in this stage:  
 
“As a US general attentively stressed, ´only Bosnia itself...can heal its own 
wounds´ and, we might add, only Bosnians are entitled to choose the 
constitutional arrangement through which Dayton can be overcome. 
Nonetheless, Europe should make more efforts, for the Bosnians, and for its 
own future.”178  
 
This would mean that the EU is on the right path supporting Bosnia, but should be more 
concerned with the Bosnian population than with Bosnian politicians. Since the Dayton 
Agreements, the democratisation process in Bosnia has begun. However, with so many 
different interests and views on how Bosnia should develop, the progress has been slow and 
inconsistent. Already in 1999, David Dlouhy, director of the US state departments’ Office of 
Bosnia Implementation, said that ‘democratic concepts of accountability to the public and 
transparency are not yet second nature to most Bosnians’179 
Gradually this is changing in Bosnian society. Bosnians who do not identify themselves with 
the nationalist parties and the ethnic division in Bosnia are expressing their opinions. In 
developing the democratisation of Bosnia it is therefore not that the EU provides the right 
support, but that the Bosnian citizens make themselves heard. As Bassenauer puts it:  
 
“Citizens have given up on being able to foment social progress through 
representative politics; governing institutions are in any case not genuinely 
representative, nor do they perform their institutional roles. (…) This seems 
like a civic confrontation with the entire Dayton establishment: political elites, 
governments and state institutions altogether.”180  
 
Although the EU has supported Bosnia in the whole process, it has undermined the same 
Bosnian politics it created itself. This has not helped in the improvement or reform of the 
Dayton Agreements, but has caused more hostility. Bosnia is not a member of the EU, it is the 
country of the Bosnians. So far, it applies here that the EU has to leave Bosnia to the 
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Bosnians, instead of supporting the constitution signed by warring parties divided along 
ethnic lines. 
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Conclusion 
 
The aim of this thesis was to explain the approaches of the EU towards Bosnia and to explain 
the influence of the EU on Bosnia’s constitution since the Dayton Agreement that ended the 
war in 1995. In analysing the EU’s actions within Bosnia it looked for the limitations of the 
EU in the region. The research question of the thesis was: How effective has the EU been in 
its actions towards Bosnia in the period since the Dayton Agreement?    
 
With the use of key constructivist concepts the analyses of the EU’s actions were explained. 
On the basis of documents from the main EU institutions - the European Parliament, the 
European Commission and the Council - analyses were made on how Bosnia was treated 
within the EU and how EU actions in Bosnia and the EU’s attitude towards Bosnia was 
discussed in the EU institutions. Furthermore, secondary sources were used to compare 
analyses given on the EU’s actions in Bosnia and Bosnia’s democratisation.  
 
From a constructivist approach the EU is analysed as an institution that acts not only as a 
global actor that wants to expand its power, but as an actor that acts based upon its own 
structure. This structure is formed by its history and its norms and values. For the EU the 
aspects of its norms and values of democracy, rule of law and protection of human rights form 
its actions. From this, its behaviour can be explained. Towards Bosnia, the EU can thus only 
act from its own structure. This structure of the EU results in the expectation that the EU will 
act in Bosnia for it is a European country. The EU is expected to defend its norms and values 
and the human rights worldwide. At the same time, this structure constrains the EU to act 
effectively in Bosnia, for Bosnia’s self-identity heavily differs with its identity as perceived 
by the EU, and it can only act from its own identity carrying these norms and values, resulting 
in ineffectiveness. 
  The EU does support Bosnia on its way to EU accession since the establishment of the 
Dayton Accords. This aid consists of humanitarian aid, financial aid and military support in 
the country. The EU was disappointed in the lack of cooperation from the Bosnian authorities 
and often discussed the need for reforms that have to be achieved by the Bosnian government. 
Although it does indicate that the constitution set up in Bosnia in the Dayton Agreements was 
a short-term solution, it puts the responsibility for reforms on the Bosnian authorities, who are 
too divided to find appropriate reforms for Bosnia. 
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So far, the EU’s actions in Bosnia are derived from the European perspective. Because of this, 
the actions keep being insufficient for they neglect the Bosnian identity and the fact that it has 
a different historical background and a structure aberrant of the European structure. The EU’s 
discussions on Bosnia turn out to be more out of self-interest and for the security of the EU 
itself rather than truly effective for the development of Bosnia to be able to become a 
candidate country.  
  Despite the fact that all of the EU led initiatives have invested a lot of money in the 
country, the role of the HR means that the credibility gap widens. The HR can impose laws on 
the Bosnian politicians and has the power to fire them. This results in an imposed democracy 
on Bosnia, where the EU decides what is democratised and what is not.  Because this is 
contradictory to what the EU stands for, the Bosnian citizens are easily won over to the 
nationalist Bosnian leaders. This credibility gap has resulted in the weakened principle of 
conditionality. From this, Bosnian leaders can take advantage in order to win the support of 
the people. Due to this conflicting interest, Bosnia is not able to progress with development 
towards Europeanisation.  
 
The EU has supported Bosnia since the end of the war, having several aid programmes and 
continuing negotiations with Bosnia. However, as the EU acts from its own norms and values 
not taking into consideration the different Bosnian identity, this does not lead to improvement 
or closer accession to the EU. The EU deals with the same Bosnian leaders it criticises and 
works from an outdated agreement. As long as the EU does not recognise that the constitution 
is undemocratic in of itself and does not assume its own norms and values will be 
automatically followed, its actions within Bosnia will stay ineffective. A good example tends 
to be followed. The EU however, does not act as a good example within Bosnia, imposing 
their norms and values and conserving in this way an undemocratic democracy. For Bosnia as 
an economy that still has much room for development, the saying applies here that it is ‘better 
to trade than aid.’ The EU has to change its attitude in order to be effective, because its 
attitude in Bosnia seems to emanate from consciousness, not effectiveness. 
 
Limitations of current research 
Being a small study of the substantial complex situation in Bosnia and the influence of the EU 
therein, this research can be expanded. Here, the EU perspective from a constructivist point of 
view on Bosnia is examined and analysed. However, this perspective could also be examined 
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from other theories in order to expand the perspective of EU involvement in Bosnia since the 
end of the war. As this research was limited in part due to language obstacles and the 
accessibility of Bosnian sources, a more comprehensive examination of the Bosnian 
perspective would greatly increase the scope and depth of the analysis, for example through 
looking at  the perception of the EU from the Bosnian politicians at the centre of the 
negotiations, as well as from Bosnian commentators and the public. 
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